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1. Abstract 
North Carolina uses a structured sentencing system intended to provide order and conformity to 
sentencing outcomes. But is the North Carolina criminal justice system truly blind to differences, 
or do factors outside the legal scope play a role in how harshly defendants are sentenced? This 
study aims to answer that question by exploring the role of various case factors on sentencing 
harshness outcomes. This study looks at A-D level felony cases between October 1, 2013 and 
December 31, 2017 from the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Court Database. I 
create a harshness index that compares the sentence a defendant received with the sentence they 
were at risk of receiving. The study finds that the most important factors in the harshness of 
sentencing are prior criminal record points and the type of plea defendants take. Having more 
prior criminal record points leads to less harsh treatment and pleading not guilty leads to harsher 
treatment. Additionally, this study finds statistically significant results that white men are 
sentenced harsher than white women, and older defendants are sentenced harsher than the 
youngest defendants. The results show no statistically significant disparities for black men or 
black women. There is no significant difference for the type of attorney a defendant has, and 
sentencing harshness is relatively consistent across location factors. Overall, this study is 
grounded in a theory of blameworthiness of the defendant. 
 
2. Introduction 
 
In 1993, North Carolina passed innovative structured sentencing legislation aimed at overhauling 
the state’s troubled criminal justice system. The structured sentencing program was lauded as a 
groundbreaking piece of legislation, even receiving one of tens Innovations in American 
Government Awards from Harvard University and the Ford Foundation in 1997 (Duncan, Speir, 
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and Meredith, n.d.). However, few studies have thoroughly assessed the North Carolina 
Structured Sentencing Act’s effects quantitatively. This study builds off of Horton (2005), 
Brennan (2008), and Abrams and Feckler’s (2018) analyses of racial disparities in North 
Carolina’s sentencing. However, this study adds more variables of interest, operationalizes 
sentencing harshness differently, and focuses on higher level offenses. Through this study, I will 
analyze various independent variables’ impacts on harshness in sentencing, operationalized as 
the real sentencing outcome a defendant receives as a proportion of the overall risk they were 
potentially able to receive. This study examines the impacts of a race/sex interaction, age, 
attorney type, judicial district, county population size, judicial district political context, judicial 
district racial composition, prior criminal record points, offense severity, and plea type. Clearly, 
this study takes a wide-reaching approach to understand what may cause disparities in sentencing 
harshness under a system intended to minimize disparity except for a few legal factors. The 
following essay will begin by examining North Carolina’s current sentencing law and its origins 
to understand the background and motivations of the law. Then, prior literature on how certain 
variables impact sentencing will be discussed in order to explain the construction of this article’s 
hypotheses and theories. Particular focus will be given to the theory of blameworthiness of the 
defendant. Next, I will explain the construction of my dataset and the research approach this 
article takes. Finally, I will outline the results of the study and discuss its important implications. 
 
3. The Law and its History 
To begin, it is important to examine North Carolina’s sentencing law and how it was established. 
Understanding North Carolina sentencing policy is crucial to figuring out how disparities arise in 
practice. Additionally, the history of the law’s creation allows for a better understanding of its 
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intent. With that intent in mind, we can contextualize its effect and suggest whether it has 
accomplished its goals. This section will begin by explaining the law as it stands today (which is 
not very different from its first form) and then proceed to trace the origin of the law over time. 
 
3.1 The Law 
 
As the law stands today, there are only three legal factors for disparities in sentencing: offense 
classification, prior criminal record, and discretion to find the crime to be presumptive, 
mitigating, or aggravating. North Carolina uses punishment grids in sentencing; there is a grid 
for felonies and a grid for misdemeanors. Because this study focuses on disparities among high-
level felonies, only the felony chart will be discussed. Figure 1 shows the felony sentencing grid 
below (North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission, 2014; hereafter NCSPAC). 
 In Figure 1, the horizontal rows represent various offense classifications. The more 
severe the crime is, the closer the offense classification will be to A, while the less severe crimes 
are closer to I. Crimes between felony classifications A-D (the focus sample of this study) are 
typically serious violent crimes. Lower-level crimes classified as felonies E-I tend to be less 
serious and usually deal with property issues. Higher offense classifications lead to larger 
sentences (NCSPAC, 2014). 
 The second legal factor, prior criminal record, can be viewed as the vertical columns in 
the grid of Figure 1. Six columns break down the various sentencing ranges based on groupings 
of the defendant’s prior record level (NCSPAC, 2014). Different crimes are associated with a 
different number of points, with more severe crimes receiving a larger number of points than 
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small misdemeanors (Lubitz, 1993). Those defendants with larger criminal histories are 
sentenced with more severe punishments than those with smaller criminal histories. 
 Finally, the third factor for which the law allows for sentencing disparities is whether the 
case is found to be presumptive, aggravating, or mitigating. In Figure 1, within each cell of the 
grid, there are three ranges. The top range is for aggravating cases, the middle is for presumptive, 
and the bottom is for mitigating. These three designations allow for legal distinction in 
sentencing based on whether the case is more or less severe than average. In sentencing, the 
judge will normally use the presumptive range, which is established as the sentence for an 
average crime for a defendant convicted under that offense classification who has that number of 
prior criminal record points. Approximately 69% of cases in North Carolina are ultimately 
considered presumptive. However, prosecutors can petition for a case to be sentenced in the 
aggravating range if they believe that the offender deserves a harsher than average punishment. 
In that situation, the burden is on the prosecutor to determine that the case is eligible for an 
aggravating level sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Only about 4% of cases are sentenced in 
this higher category. Also, the defense can petition for a case to be sentenced as a mitigating case 
and receive a less harsh sentence. In that situation, the burden is on the defense to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the case is in fact deserving of the designation as mitigated. About 27% 
of cases end in the mitigated range. Also, the defense and the prosecutor can stipulate that the 
case should be one of the aforementioned designations, and the judge will typically follow that 
recommendation in sentencing. Ultimately, once the judge receives a petition for sentencing 
under an alternative level, they will have to decide whether they agree with the filing party that 
the case deserves a designation as being aggravating or mitigating. If the judge decides that the 
case is average, they can sentence the defendant under the presumptive range (Markham, 2011). 
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 Once the appropriate cell in the grid is chosen and the judge determines whether the case 
is presumptive, aggravating, or mitigating, the judge can pick a sentence from within the 
designated range. Judicial discretion exists here because the judge can choose any number within 
that range to set as the minimum sentence. The judge can have a big impact because the ranges 
are as wide as 97 months (8 years), as is the case for presumptive Class B1 Felonies for 
defendants with 18 or more prior criminal record points (North Carolina Judicial System, 2018; 
hereafter NCJS). The sentencing amount can also be determined by plea negotiations between 
the prosecutor and the defense. If the two parties reach a plea deal, they can determine a certain 
value of sentencing based on the grid or a range within the grid. Most cases end in plea deals, 
and often the defendant is incentivized to plead guilty because the prosecutor offers to sentence 
them under the guidelines for a lower-level charge (Smith, 2005).  
 Each minimum sentence value determined from Figure 1 is associated with a maximum 
sentence value found in Figure 2. The first large grouping of numbers in Figure 2 shows the 
corresponding maximum value for each minimum number of months. The smaller grouping of 
numbers below shows the corresponding maximum values for sexual offenses. Sexual offenses 
have higher maximums than other felonies. Under the law, defendants will be dealing with the 
criminal justice system in one form or another until the end of their maximum sentence 
(NCSPAC, 2014). However, if defendants are sentenced to an active prison punishment, with 
good behavior, defendants are eligible to leave prison after they pass their minimum sentence. 
Defendants who leave prison after their minimum sentence expires must remain under 
supervised release until their maximum sentence expires (Markham, Sentencing Reduction 
Credit, 2010). 
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Figure 1: Minimum Sentencing Grid for Felonies Committed on or After October 2013 
(NCJS, 2018). 
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Figure 2: Corresponding Maximum Sentences (NCJS, 2018). 
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In some cases, the defendant will be convicted of multiple offenses. In the sentencing 
hearing, the prosecution and the defense make recommendations for how defendants of this type 
should be sentenced.1 The sentencing judge has three options in this scenario: consecutive, 
concurrent, or consolidated sentencing. In consecutive sentencing, the sentences are run back-to-
back; the sentence lengths are added up and the total sum is served. Concurrent sentencing 
allows the judge to run all the sentences at the same time (Markham, 2016). For example, a 
defendant may have three convictions associated with 24 months, 14 months, and four months in 
prison sentences respectively. Running the sentences concurrently means that all the sentences 
will begin to be served at the same time, and in this case the defendant will spend 24 months in 
prison. Finally, consolidated sentencing allows the judge to take multiple convictions and 
sentence the defendant under a single conviction, typically their most serious offense (Markham, 
2016). A defendant with a murder charge, three counts of burglary, and two misdemeanors could 
have their sentence consolidated and only be sentenced for the murder charge. Similarly, if a 
defendant has five counts of armed robbery, their sentence could be consolidated so that they are 
sentenced for one count of armed robbery. 
 
3.2 History 
 
This next section will examine the history of the previously discussed sentencing law in North 
Carolina. Discussion will begin with the foundations and implementation of the prior sentencing 
legislation, the Fair Sentencing Act. Then, the foundations and process of today’s structured 
                                                          
1 Because this study focuses on A-D level felonies for which the only possible sentence is active prison time, the 
discussion of sentencing alternatives, such as those with a combination of active and intermediate sentencing, will 
not be included in this discussion. 
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sentencing policy will be discussed. Finally, the ways in which the law has changed since it was 
first implemented in the 1990s will be addressed. 
 
3.2a Origins – Problems in North Carolina’s Prisons 
 
 
North Carolina’s judicial system has been plagued with problems throughout its history. North 
Carolina’s justice system was being increasingly viewed as ineffective in the 1970s. Minorities 
were being sentenced to disproportionately longer sentences, and the system was not 
successfully rehabilitating people. The state had the largest prison population per capita in the 
United States. North Carolina used indeterminate sentencing, a system with few restrictions on 
judicial power, allowing for wide ranges in sentencing outcomes.  Recognizing a need to create 
fairness in sentencing and a desire to be tough on crime, the General Assembly established the 
Knox Commission in 1974. Comprised of members of the General Assembly, the Knox 
Commission was intended to create a more formalized system of criminal justice legislation. The 
Knox Commission designed the Fair Sentencing Act, a system that had elements of both 
determinate and indeterminate sentencing. The Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) tried to balance a 
desire for standardization of sentencing with permission for judicial discretion. Judges were 
given guidelines for crimes but were allowed to sentence defendants to lower levels if they 
deemed that there were justifications (Freeman, 2000). Figure 3 shows the Fair Sentencing Act 
punishment chart. The FSA sorted offenses into various classifications and set corresponding 
presumptive sentences and maximum sentences. The corresponding sentences clearly allowed 
judges to have significant discretion in sentencing, as much as 35 years of discretion for C level 
felonies. In addition, good behavior in prison led to substantially lower sentences. Every day a 
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defendant spent in prison without a major infraction, one day was taken off their total sentence 
(Markham, 2014).  
 
Figure 3: Fair Sentencing Act Punishment Chart (Markham, 2014) 
 
 
However, in the late 1980’s, it was clear that the Fair Sentencing Act was failing. North 
Carolina’s judicial system faced serious problems. First and foremost, the state’s prisons had 
become overcrowded (Freeman, 2000). The overcrowding left the state vulnerable to lawsuits, 
leading to the recognition that change was needed. The North Carolina General Assembly 
(NCGA) responded by placing a cap on the prison population and allowing for discretionary 
parole, changes that led to people leaving prisons at high rates. Prison sentences became 
essentially meaningless; people were serving on average only 18% of their sentences (Lubitz, 
1993). 
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3.2b Creating and Passing Structured Sentencing 
 
It was in this politically troubled landscape that the General Assembly established the Sentencing 
and Policy Advisory Commission. The main charges of the Commission were to establish new 
offense classifications, create a structured sentencing system, investigate community-based 
alternatives for certain offenses, and make a computer model to indicate the plan’s effects on 
North Carolina’s prison populations (Lubitz, 1993). The 23-member Commission brought 
together public and private groups to determine efficient and effective criminal justice policy 
solutions. The Commission differed in opinions about the best solution to the problems; should 
they find solutions that increase or decrease incarceration? There was significant disagreement 
over this question. The Commission’s final plan attempted to meld punishment and 
rehabilitation. Four subcommittees made solutions to “1) establish offense structures, 2) establish 
defendant structures, 3) propose dispositional recommendations, [and] 4) propose durational 
recommendations” (Freeman, 2000). The resulting proposal was essentially the structured 
sentencing law discussed in the previous section. The Commission decided to increase the 
punishment for high-level, violent crime and decrease the severity of punishment for more minor 
offenses like property crimes. They also decided that the only factor that should be mandatorily 
included in sentencing (outside of the details of the crime itself) was prior criminal record 
because this was viewed as an indicator of future criminal activity. In addition, the Commission 
also created options for alternatives to incarceration for lower-level offenses; intermediate 
punishment systems, much like parole, were bolstered to allow low-level defendants more 
freedom while also being supervised (Lubitz, 1993). 
Once the Sentencing Commission’s suggestions reached the General Assembly, the bills 
moved relatively quickly and easily, garnering significant bipartisan support. The House of 
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Representatives took up the proposals from the Commission first, making changes to post-
release supervision but otherwise keeping the grids intact. The Senate received the House version 
and leaders from both chambers ironed out their desired changes. Ultimately, the plan passed 
both chambers unanimously, receiving unanimous votes in the House and Senate (Lubitz, 1993). 
The bill received support from Democratic Governor Jim Hunt, who even advocated for a 
change that allowed for life without parole sentences for cases of first-degree murder (Betts, 
1995). Clearly, there was substantial bipartisan support for this type of criminal justice reform at 
the time. The final version of the law was viewed as a “compromise… [that] offered something 
for everyone to like and something to dislike” (Lubitz, 1993). However, there is evidence that 
people generally supported the law’s increase in punishment for high level offenders, decrease in 
the use of prison for low level offenders, and creation of sentences with meaning and reliability 
(a 20-year sentence means 20 years of prison time) (Lubitz, 1993).  
 
3.2d National Criminal Justice Context 
 
The law passed by the General Assembly was not fully unique at the time. Rather, it can be 
contextualized in a wider movement throughout the 1980s and 1990s to follow up “tough on 
crime” attitudes with determinate sentencing (Freeman, 2000). The Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(n.d.) filed a report detailing the rise and promise of determinate structured sentencing policies. 
Indeterminate sentencing was nationally popular before the 1970s, largely because it allowed for 
significant discretion so that defendants could be treated differently based on their individuality. 
Indeterminate sentencing gives substantial power to a parole board to decide when an 
incarcerated person is released within a wide-ranging minimum and maximum sentence. The 
large discretion permitted in indeterminate sentencing systems was criticized by those who 
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believed it led to disparities based on extralegal factors. As incarceration became used more 
widely and the criminal justice system grew, standardization became increasingly desired. In the 
late 1970s, states began experimenting with legislative alternatives to increase standardization in 
sentencing. These sentencing models took different forms between states. Many states made a 
similar decision to North Carolina to pursue presumptive sentencing. Others like California, 
Arizona, and Indiana chose determinate sentencing models, in which defendants are given a clear 
minimum and maximum sentence for a specific crime. Then, the defendant can earn release 
closer to the minimum sentence based on good behavior in a way that removed the power from 
the parole board. Additionally, a few states like Virginia, Maryland, and Louisiana set voluntary 
sentencing recommendations. Because these recommendations were voluntary, they still 
maintained significant judicial discretion. By 1994, over 20 states had shifted away from 
indeterminate sentencing in favor of alternative experimental options that imposed some degree 
of standardization. Ultimately, the root of these changes was a desire for increasing harshness in 
the criminal justice system (BJA, n.d.). 
When thinking about the rise of mass incarceration, “tough on crime” policies of the 
1980s and 1990s come to mind. The national narrative often focuses on decisions made by white 
men in the White House, but the story is more complicated than that. In his Pulitzer Prize 
winning book, Locking up our Own, James Forman Jr. (2017) details the wide base of support 
for harsher sentencing policies. “Tough on crime” policies received bipartisan support and 
sometimes received higher levels of support among black communities where crime had more 
tragic effects. Forman Jr. (2017) argues that black communities of this time largely believed that 
harsher punishment was a necessary deterrent for crime. There was bipartisan support for these 
increasingly harsh sentencing laws because people believed that policies like the one passed in 
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North Carolina would improve quality of life in crime-ridden communities. Additionally, 
decisions made at the state level have the most impact because the criminal justice system is 
largely a state’s issue. Clearly, a movement of harsh policies was sweeping the country and it 
garnered a large, diverse base of support. 
 
3.2e Changes to Date 
 
Since the 1990s, there have been some changes made to North Carolina’s structured sentencing 
policy, but the overall structure of the punishment grids has remained the same since the law was 
first implemented in 1995 (NCJS, 2018). The main adjustments to the law have been in offense 
classification and the corresponding sentence length. In 2009, a new grid was implemented that 
reduced possible sentence lengths for most offenses, particularly for offenders with medium 
prior criminal record points. An alteration implemented in 2011 reduced the corresponding 
maximum value for each minimum sentence length by three months. The 2011 update also 
increased the maximum values for F-I felonies by nine months each. Additionally, it created 
special instructions for sexual offenses to multiply the minimum sentence months by 1.2 and add 
60 months. Finally, the law was again updated in October of 2013, taking its current form. 
Unlike before, the 2013 law mandated that A-level felony defendants under 18 were only 
allowed receive life without parole. This update eliminated the option for sentencing minors to 
the death penalty (NCJS, 2018).  
While there have been some adjustments since 1995, the major elements of the law remain 
the same. North Carolina’s sentencing law maintains its structural grid form that categorizes 
crimes based on offense classes (A-I Felonies). The law’s ranges of defendant’s prior criminal 
record points and the three levels accounting for presumptive, mitigating, and aggravated crimes 
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have also continued throughout its existence. Overall, the changes since 1995 have been limited 
adjustments to the sentence lengths, the addition of harsher sentencing for sexual offenders, and 
the abolition of the death penalty for juveniles (NCJS, 2018). 
 
3.3 Law and History Conclusions 
 
This section served to describe the way in which North Carolina’s sentencing law works and 
why it was created this way. North Carolina’s criminal justice system was experiencing 
significant challenges in the mid-late 20th century. North Carolina was ultimately on the forefront 
of a growing modern trend of structured sentencing and mandatory minimums. The state altered 
its legislation during a wave in which the country was approaching crime with harsher 
punishments. In an attempt to solve the problems North Carolina’s criminal justice system faced, 
the North Carolina General Assembly established the Sentencing and Policy Advisory 
Commission. The Commission represented broad societal groups with varying interests, 
demonstrating that the law was a bipartisan compromise. This bipartisan nature is underlined by 
the fact that the law passed smoothly with no significant opposition in the General Assembly and 
was signed by the Democratic governor.  
 Through the remainder of this essay, I will evaluate the effects of the Structured 
Sentencing Act and help shed light on whether or not the law met its initial goals. The primary 
goals of this law were to alleviate prison overcrowding and chaotic sentencing terms. The law 
did this by creating a structure that minimized judicial discretion, decreased prison sentences for 
low level offenders, and increased prison sentence harshness for high level offenders, the 
targeted group of this study. At some level there was a desire to decrease disparities which wide 
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judicial discretion could create. Whether this desire was genuine or merely a way to sell the bill 
is unclear but seeing as the law garnered bipartisan support and that it was crafted by a 
Commission of wide-ranging backgrounds, limiting disparities seems like a somewhat genuine 
concern.  
 As has been discussed in this section, the 1993 legislation is essentially the same as the 
legislation that exists today, and it does constrain judicial discretion. The law also defines the 
only legal factors eligible for determining sentencing outcome to be prior criminal record points 
and the offense severity. The sentencing grids established by the law have dictated the way that 
North Carolina has processed criminal cases for the past 26 years, albeit with some minor 
alterations. 
 
4 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
4.1 Prior Studies 
 
My research serves to evaluate whether several factors impact the harshness of sentencing 
outcomes. This chapter discusses my hypotheses for each factor in sentencing harshness based 
on a review of the relevant literature and the theories explaining the hypotheses. First, I present 
theories on identity characteristics’ impacts on sentencing outcomes. Then, I discuss theories of 
sentencing disparities in legal factors. This is followed by a discussion of the literature and 
theory about a semi-legal factor, plea type. Overall, my theories are connected through the 
concept of blameworthiness. Factors that the court decide make a defendant more blameworthy 
are expected to lead to harsher sentencing outcomes. At the end of the chapter, I conclude by 
offering my guiding hypotheses for the study. 
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4.1a Extralegal Factors 
 
Extralegal factors are any categories that are not legally allowed to affect sentencing outcomes. 
People are not supposed to be treated differently in a court of law based on factors outside the 
nature of their case and their prior criminal record. However, prior research has made it clear that 
disparities do exist in the criminal justice system based on a few extralegal factors. The purpose 
of this study is to observe whether there are disparities in sentencing based on these extralegal 
factors in North Carolina’s sentencing. The extralegal factors examined in this study include 
race, sex, age, court district, county population, political context, district racial composition, and 
attorney type. This section explains what prior research has found about how each of these 
extralegal factors impacts sentencing harshness. This section also identifies the underlying 
theories behind these disparities in harshness. 
 The first three factors of study, race, sex, and age, are grouped as identity characteristics. 
After examining what the research has found about each of those three factors individually, a 
section will follow explaining studies that have taken an intersectional approach to these 
categories. Black, middle-aged men are expected to be sentenced the most harshly. These 
characteristics make up stereotypes of a criminal, underscoring the defendant’s blameworthiness 
and their perceived threat to the community. 
 The other factors, population size, judicial districts, political context, racial composition, 
and type of attorney, will follow. It is expected that being in a rural county will lead to greater 
harshness in sentencing because of shock-value and fewer constraints due to jail overcrowding. It 
is also expected that harshness will be greatest for defendants with court appointed private 
attorneys and those who self-represent. Defendants will be better off with public defenders, but 
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the best outcomes will occur for those defendants with private attorneys. This variation is 
expected because of incentive structures for the attorneys and variation in access to resources. 
Additionally, there is expected to be some random variation based on judicial district because 
while courts are tasked with following the same law of the State of North Carolina, they are also 
run by locally elected officials with different values. Variation in sentencing harshness is 
expected based on other location factors. It is predicted that predominantly white and Republican 
districts will sentence defendants more harshly than Democratic districts with higher minority 
populations. These results are expected because of differences in value systems of blame and the 
importance of regional elections in North Carolina’s courts. There is proven variation between 
counties regarding sentencing outcomes that are not explained through individual case variation 
(Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). 
 
Race 
 
Race is a pervasive element of discrimination throughout society. The history of the United 
States demonstrates that black and Hispanic people experience discrimination based on their 
race.2 Based on this background and the prior research discussed below, black people are 
expected to experience harsher sentencing outcomes than white people. Additionally, it is 
expected that the stereotypical criminal is viewed as a black offender, so throughout the criminal 
justice system black offenders are disproportionately viewed as a threat to the community. It is 
also expected that part of this sentencing harshness disparity results from black defendants being 
viewed as more blameworthy than their white counterparts. 
                                                          
2 This study will only focus on black and white defendants. 
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 Hamilton (2017) conducts an empirical study on sentencing disparities under the federal 
sentencing system. Her research is meant to answer questions on individual cases and regional 
groupings. Hamilton operationalizes sentencing disparity by determining whether there was an 
upward departure. Upward departure occurs in the federal system (and some state systems) if the 
judge finds there is aggravating evidence. The sentencing guideline is determined to be too 
lenient, so the judge is able to sentence a defendant more than the guideline would allow. 
Hamilton uses many independent variables including level of conviction, number of counts, 
criminal history, offense type, acceptance of responsibility, sex, race (white or nonwhite), 
citizenship status, age (over or under 50), whether the defendant was in custody, and if the case 
went to trial. Ultimately, the study concludes that there is some racial impact in determining 
upward departure, with nonwhite defendants receiving higher rates of this harsher sentence. 
Hamilton suggests that the high number of variables potentially diminish the presence of the 
effect, but the racial disparity exists nonetheless. The study also finds that upward departure is 
more likely if the sentence level is higher, there is a larger criminal history, there is a larger 
number of counts, the defendant does not accept responsibility, the defendant is male, the 
defendant is a U.S. Citizen, the defendant is over 50, and the defendant is in custody. There is 
evidence presented in the study that the region of the court plays a role in which of the disparities 
present themselves and the strength with which they do so (Hamilton, 2017). 
 Mustard (2001) attempts to determine the effect of race, ethnicity, and sex on sentencing 
severity in the federal system. The study uses controls of court type, offense level, and criminal 
history. Ultimately, the study confirms that there is a racial disparity which harms nonwhite 
people. Beyond race, the study determines that sex, education, income, and citizenship are 
important factors in sentencing length. The researcher accounted for the method of disparity in 
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sentencing by observing the rates of upward and downward departures. Downward departure is 
the opposite of upward departure in which the judge finds mitigating evidence and provides a 
lower level sentence. Downward departures were the reason for a significant portion of the 
sentencing disparity. Beyond longer sentences, the study determines that when there is the option 
to get no prison sentence, black people are less likely than white people to receive that option. 
Additionally, black people have a higher likelihood of upward departure (Mustard, 2001).  
 Kutateladze et al. (2014) seeks to understand the racial effect at different steps throughout 
the sentencing procedure. Using data from New York’s District Attorney’s Office, the 
researchers determined that black and Latino people had a higher likelihood of being 
incarcerated, detained, and offered a custodial plea deal. Cases against white and Latino people 
were also dismissed at significantly greater rates than black people. The researchers look at 
Asian populations and see mixed results, but they can determine that they often receive more 
lenient treatment than even white offenders. Clearly, the study underscores that black people and 
Hispanic people experience harsher sentencing outcomes (Kutateladze et al., 2014). 
In her dissertation, Horton (2005) investigated the sentencing disparities that exist in 
North Carolina. Because her study focuses specifically on North Carolina’s specific sentencing 
program, Horton’s research is the most directly relevant for understanding the theoretical 
framework. Horton (2005) focused on people convicted of low-level felonies for the years 1998 
to 2000. Because her research looked at low level felonies, one of her dependent variables was 
whether the defendant was sentenced to an active or intermediate sentence. The research 
determined that nonwhite people were more likely than white people to be given active 
sentences. Horton (2005) also determined that in two out of the three years of focus, of those 
who were convicted of a low-level felony, nonwhite people were given statistically significant 
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longer minimum prison sentences than their white counterparts. The researcher theorizes that the 
first year of her study was closer to the introduction of the new sentencing law, so judges were 
more cautious about sentencing disparities. Horton (2005) does not investigate sex, attorney 
type, number of convictions, or geographic backgrounds of the defendants to determine the 
impact on sentencing. 
Brennan (2008) serves to understand race’s impact on sentencing in drug related offenses 
in North Carolina. One year of drug offenses for “one administrative courtroom in North 
Carolina” was analyzed for this study (Brennan, 2008). Brennan (2008) operationalized sentence 
severity by determining whether the offender received active, intermediate, or community 
punishment. Independent variables included race, sex, age, education, employment, attorney 
type, length of residence, pretrial release, prior criminal history, prior incarceration, current 
probation status, known criminal alias, offense class, drug type, and number of indictment 
charges; clearly the study takes many factors into account. The study concludes that there are 
racial disparities that exist within sentencing: White offenders receive much less severe 
sentences than their black and Hispanic counterparts. The research also showed that Hispanic 
offenders received the most severe sentences (Brennan, 2008).  
 
Sex 
 
In a review of literature on sentencing disparities based on sex, it is clear that the overwhelming 
majority of research supports the finding that female defendants are given significantly less 
punitive sentences than males (Albonetti, 1997; Bickle and Peterson, 1991; Nagel and Johnson, 
1994; Doerner and Demuth, 2012; Tillyer et al. 2015; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). While some of 
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the disparity between the sexes has been found to be caused by legal factors like the types of 
crimes committed by men versus women, the research below proves that there is extralegal 
disparity based on sex as well. Extralegal sentencing disparity based on sex is most commonly 
theorized to result from chivalry. Women are typically seen as less violent and less of a risk to 
the community. Additionally, pregnancy and child care needs could play a role in maintaining 
chivalry; Women are potentially viewed as important caretakers deserving less harsh sentences. 
Men are also stereotypically seen as more aggressive and blameworthy (Bickle and Peterson, 
1991; Tillyer et al., 2015). A second theory, the evil woman theory, provides a caveat for 
women’s benefit in sentencing. Women who commit worse crimes or have larger criminal 
records are viewed outside of the mold of a woman deserving of chivalry, and therefore do not 
receive more lenient sentencing (Tillyer et al., 2015). The following section discusses research 
regarding the effect of sex on sentencing outcomes: 
 Bickle and Peterson (1991) view sex’s effect on sentencing through the lens of families. 
Expanding on the theory of paternalism and chivalry which result in more lenient sentencing 
outcomes for female defendants, their study attempts to find distinction between women who 
receive more lenient sentences and those that do not. Bickle and Peterson’s research allows for 
further development of the paternalistic theory to include intersectional effects of families. The 
researchers look at a sample of male and female defendants involved in federal forgery cases. 
The study includes explanatory variables to define and categorize the family structure: marital 
status, dependents (presence vs. support), financial source, and housing are all used. The 
researchers also control for number of offenses, offense level (based on the federal guidelines), 
and prior criminal history. In their research, Bickle and Peterson determined that some of their 
explanatory variables that operationalized the family were important in sentencing disparities, 
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but others were not. Marital status, having and caring for dependents, and living arrangement all 
impact sentencing disparities. These findings add to the theory of chivalry by demonstrating that 
there is a sex effect based on family status. While married women receive more lenient sentences 
than unmarried women, married men receive harsher sentences. It is theorized that married men 
who get involved with the criminal justice system are viewed more negatively because they are 
not fulfilling their sex-defined familial responsibilities. The study looked at intersectional effects 
as well and found that race also played a role in the harshness outcome (Bickle and Peterson, 
1991). 
Nagel and Johnson (1994) looks at federal sentencing policies to determine whether there 
is a sex effect in sentencing. The study undertakes a significant review of the existing literature 
on sex disparities in sentencing. The researchers also conducted an empirical review of various 
forms of offenses to compare the rate of downward departure for women versus men. The courts 
have held that pregnancy and single parenthood are not causes for downward departure (Nagel 
and Johnson 199-201). However, ultimately the study finds that though sentencing is supposed to 
be somewhat standardized, women still get a more lenient treatment in sentencing (Nagel and 
Johnson, 1994). 
Doerner and Demuth (2012) confirm that women are sentenced less harshly than men 
through their study. In their analysis, the researchers assess the variation in legal and extralegal 
factors that explain disparities in sentencing. The thought is that any sentencing disparity that 
exists between men and women could be due at least in part to legal factors. Women may 
commit different crimes than men, or they may play different roles in the crimes. Ultimately, the 
study finds that accounting for the legal factors, women still receive much more lenient treatment 
in sentencing than men (Doerner and Demuth, 2012).  
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Koeppel (2014) is a contradictory study on the impact of sex in sentencing. Based on her 
study, Koeppel finds that sex does not have an impact on the severity of experience in the 
sentencing process. However, Koeppel’s study is limited by using data from only five rural 
counties in Iowa. Her sample size of N=507 is low and would therefore have the potential to 
disrupt the findings. The selection of five rural counties in Iowa is also not a randomized sample, 
so one should hesitate when drawing larger conclusions from this study. This is especially true 
because the study stands so contradictory to a vast wealth of other literature that finds a sex-
based effect in sentencing (Koeppel, 2014). 
Adding to the theory of chivalry in sentencing, Tillyer et al. (2015) investigated sex’s 
interaction with criminal history and its effects on sentencing outcomes. Using data from federal 
drug cases in 2008, the researchers created a logarithmic transformation for sentence length. 
They also utilized legal, extralegal, and case processing factors (case processing being how the 
case proceeded, the presence of a plea deal, etc.). Ultimately, the study compares the treatment of 
men and women with comparable sentence lengths. It is determined that women with less 
criminal history receive more lenient sentences than men with less criminal history. However, 
women and men with more extensive criminal histories receive similar sentencing outcomes. 
This study supports the combined theories of chivalry and the evil woman. Chivalry only 
protects women from harsher sentences as long as they maintain a pure image (Tillyer et al., 
2015). 
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Age 
 
There has not been much research conducted specifically focusing on the impact of age on 
sentencing outcomes. Only one such article will be discussed in this section. Further research on 
age is included in the following section, which discusses intersectional identities. Overall, it is 
expected that age will impact sentencing outcomes (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Younger people 
have begun to be viewed through a lens of less culpability because of recent research on brain 
development (Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior, 2012; 
hereafter MGHCLBB). Similarly, older people are viewed with more leniency because of 
sympathy. However, middle aged people are expected to be sentenced most harshly. This 
prediction is because middle aged people are stereotypically the most likely to be dangerous 
repeat offenders. Also, they are considered more responsible for their actions than younger 
people. This section serves as a discussion of the research about the age effect on sentencing 
outcomes: 
In a novel study, Ryon et al. (2017) studies the specific effects of age on sentencing 
outcomes, particularly contextualized in a time when the national conversation was shifting in 
favor of reducing harsh punishments for young people. Data from Florida between 2000 and 
2006 of felony probationers convicted was analyzed. The study is robust because of its large 
sample size of over 240,000. The dependent variable is operationalized by a dichotomous 
variable of adjudication being withheld or not withheld. Age is grouped into categories that are 
pulled from previous research – youth offenders, young adults, middle aged adults, mature 
adults, older adults, and oldest adults. Control variables included race, ethnicity, sex, criminal 
history, offense level, and crime type. The study finds strong results that show a curvilinear 
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relationship between age and adjudication being withheld. Youthful offenders (18-20 years old) 
have the highest rates of adjudication being withheld. Mature adults (40-49 years old) have the 
lowest rates of adjudication being withheld. Then, oldest adults (60-69 years old) have a high 
rate of adjudications being withheld, but it is lower than for youthful offenders. The results show 
a quasi-parabolic relationship with a valley at mature adults. The study also indicates that there is 
a disparity between men and women for adjudication being withheld, but it is relatively constant 
across age (Ryon et al., 2017).  
 
An Intersectional Approach 
 
My research is intended to be intersectional and explain harshness disparities holistically. One of 
the forms that this intersectional approach takes is the inclusion of a race/sex interaction variable. 
It is expected that creating this interaction variable will make a more accurate depiction of 
sentencing disparities. A defendant does not enter the courtroom as a single factor; people have 
multiple intersectional identities. It is expected that defendants who identify as more of the risk 
groups (black men) will receive harsher sentencing outcomes than those who identify as fewer of 
the risk factors. For the interaction variable included in this study, it is expected that black men 
will be sentenced the harshest followed by white men and black women respectively. White 
women will be sentenced the least harshly. This outcome is expected based on the previously 
discussed findings on research of race and sex, and how defendant’s level of blameworthiness 
interacts with those variables. The following section discusses research that demonstrate the 
effects of taking a more intersectional approach to sentencing data: 
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Steen et al. (2005) studies how stereotypes of criminals within races determine the 
harshness of sentencing. The researchers construct indicators of a stereotypical drug offender for 
white and black offenders. A stereotypically dangerous drug offender is a male, repeat offender 
who is a dealer of high-level drugs. After comparing sentencing outcomes for data from 
Washington state, the researchers find that white offenders who meet the stereotypical drug 
offender characteristics receive harsher sentences than those who are not stereotypical. However, 
black offenders who meet the stereotypical characteristics receive milder sentences than those 
who are not stereotypical. This research suggests that intersectional identities may impact white 
offenders, but race is an overwhelmingly strong factor in determining harshness for all black 
defendants. This study also underscores the theory of blameworthiness and the creation of a 
blameworthy criminal that leads to harsher sentencing outcomes. Regardless of other factors, all 
black defendants are expected to be considered blameworthy and experience harsher sentencing 
outcomes (Steen et al., 2005). 
One of the trailblazing intersectional studies is Steffensmeier et al. (1998). This research 
looks at data from Pennsylvania to analyze the effect of race, sex, and age on sentencing. The 
study determined that race impacts sentencing outcomes much stronger in younger people than 
older people. On top of that, age matters more for men. The group which is sentenced most 
harshly is young, black men. Clearly, this research demonstrates the importance of taking an 
intersectional approach when looking at sentencing disparities. A notable finding of the study is 
that defendants under 21 are sentenced less harshly than older defendants (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998). This finding further confirms the aforementioned sections’ discussion of the age effect. 
Building off of the prior study, Spohn and Holleran (2000) examines data from three 
major U.S. metropolitan areas (Kansas City, Miami, and Chicago) to determine interactive 
31 
 
effects on sentencing’s disparate outcomes. Overall, the study finds that age, race, and sex are all 
statistically significant individually in at least one of the three cities. Age, however, has a 
stronger impact for men than for women. Additionally, race is much more of a factor among 
younger men than older men. Young black men receive the harshest treatment of anyone in 
sentencing. Young Hispanic men and middle-aged black men both receive harsher sentences 
than middle aged white men. The study was limited by the number of women; Researchers were 
not able to make conclusions about women because there were simply too few in the sample. 
The study also finds variations in harshness of sentencing for each demographic among the 
metropolitan areas (Spohn and Holleran, 2000). 
Kramer and Ulmer (2002) studies the factors that determine the likelihood of a violent 
offender in Pennsylvania receiving a downward departure (a less harsh sentence). The 
researchers find no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of receiving downward 
departure based on race. The study did find, however, that young Hispanic men have a smaller 
chance of receiving a downward departure for violent crimes (a rate of 0.61). On the other hand, 
young black women have a higher likelihood of receiving a downward departure; about four 
times the likelihood of comparable young white men. It seems that the factor with the biggest 
impact on receiving a downward departure is whether the defendant accepts a plea deal rather 
than being found guilty at trial (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). Clearly, this study complicates much 
of the previously discussed research’s findings on race, and it serves to support findings that go 
against the hypotheses. 
Doerner and Demuth (2009) use federal sentencing data to study the likelihood of 
incarceration and length of sentence. The researchers only examine U.S. citizens because the 
legal procedures vary for citizens as opposed to non-citizens. Similarly, juveniles are removed 
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from the sample. Their study finds evidence that when the independent variables are interacted, 
young, Hispanic men have the highest chance of being incarcerated and young, black men 
receive the longest sentences. Among women, Hispanics are most likely to be incarcerated 
followed by blacks and whites respectively. There was not found to be a racial disparity for 
women (Doerner and Demuth, 2009). 
In addition to their findings about the age effect of sentencing, Ryon et al. (2017) 
determine that black offenders have significantly lower rates of adjudication being withheld (less 
harsh treatment) than white and Hispanic offenders, and the disparity increases with age. Black 
men have the lowest rates while white and Hispanic women have the highest rates of 
adjudication being withheld (Ryon et al., 2017). 
Steffensmeier et al. (2017) studies the intersectionality of race, sex, and age. The study 
differentiates itself by adding greater specificity to its operationalization of ages than in prior 
studies. Of particular importance are the distinct categories for 18-20-year-old defendants and 
50+-year-olds. The study employs a mixed-methods design, first relying on quantitative court 
data from 2003-2010 in Pennsylvania and supplementing with qualitative interviews with 
Pennsylvania judges. The study’s findings support my theories of identity characteristics: blacks 
are sentenced more harshly than whites, men are sentenced more harshly than women, and adults 
21-50 are sentenced more harshly than those who are older or younger. Steffensmeier et al. 
(2017) finds that when controlling for similarities in cases, a combination of risk factors (20-40-
year-old minority male defendants) receive significantly harsher treatment by the court than 
those defendants with few risk factors (youth or adult white female defendants) (Steffensmeier et 
al., 2017). This finding underlines the importance of intersectionality in determining 
blameworthiness of a defendant before the court. 
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Overall, it is clearly important to look at sentencing outcomes intersectionally. Doing so 
provides greater insight into how the independent variables work together because in reality, they 
are not independent of each other. Collectively, the studies suggest that race, gender, and age do 
interact; Nonwhite, middle-aged men receive the harshest sentencing outcomes, and young, 
white women receive the least harsh outcomes. Race and sex are easiest to operationalize, but 
there is variation among the studies in their operationalization of age. This variation possibly 
impacts the findings. My study’s operationalization of age will most resemble Steffensmeier et 
al. (2017) in its distinction of very young defendants and very old defendants. Their results do 
indicate a middle set of ages demonstrate a peak in sentencing harshness when the variable is and 
is not interacted with other identity characteristic variables. 
 
Type of Attorney 
 
The quality of legal representation is expected to have significant impacts on a defendant’s 
sentencing outcome. Private attorneys should provide better outcomes for defendants than public 
defenders. In turn, public defenders should lead to better outcomes for their clients than court 
appointed private attorneys. Finally, waiving the right to an attorney and choosing self-
representation is expected to have comparable outcomes to being represented by a court 
appointed private attorney. According to the literature, this disparity is caused by the incentive 
structures established through compensation. Private attorneys stand to make the most money 
while public defenders have a set salary. Additionally, court appointed private attorneys typically 
get a flat rate of a small sum of money and have little incentive to work diligently in producing 
the defense of their client (Anderson and Heaton, 2012). Beyond the incentive structure, the 
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disparity in quality of representation is likely caused by a disparity in attorneys’ resources; 
attorneys with more time, resources, and supportive networks will be better equipped to defend 
their clients. A few defendants choose to waive the right to an attorney and self-represent. This 
possibility is expected to produce comparable harshness outcomes to defendants with court 
appointed private attorneys. The theory behind this expectation is that defendants are making a 
rational choice to self-represent because their attorneys would be ineffective anyway. 
Champion (1989) uses mixed methods to analyze data collected during interviews with 
prosecutors form Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky to understand the impact of having a public 
defender versus a private attorney on case outcomes. The research focused on case outcomes 
generally, whether there was a plea deal accepted, the case was dropped, or the case went to trial. 
The cases that were dropped were overwhelmingly represented by private attorneys. However, 
nearly 20% more of the cases that resulted in plea bargains used a public defender. In the 
interviews, prosecutors recognized that private attorneys are overall more favorable to their 
clients than public defenders. This study made clear that there are disparities between the quality 
of representation between public defenders and private attorneys (Champion, 1989). 
Anderson and Heaton (2012) studies the effect of attorney type on sentencing outcomes. 
The research analyzes murder cases between 1994 and 2005 in Philadelphia, comparing cases 
where the judge assigns a public defender versus cases where the judge assigns a private 
attorney. Unlike Champion (1989), Anderson and Heaton (2012) separate public defenders and 
court appointed private attorneys. Philadelphia randomly assigns one-fifth of its murder 
defendants a public defender and the other four-fifths a court appointed private attorney. This 
fact is significant because the two types of attorneys have different incentive structures for cases. 
Court appointed private attorneys receive a flat rate fee that incentivizes them to quickly move 
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through cases; There is no reward for thoroughness. Additionally, through qualitative interviews 
the study found that there are fewer resources and less of a network of support for private 
attorneys than public defenders. The study found that defendants with public defenders were 
sentenced to significantly lower levels than those who were given a court appointed private 
attorney (Anderson and Heaton, 2012).  
In the first-of-its-kind study, Hashimoto (2007) studies the outcomes produced by 
defendant’s choosing self-representation. They wanted to learn if waiving the right to counsel 
really does lead to significantly worse outcomes for defendants. The study uses three databases, 
two with federal data and one with state data from 75 counties across the country. The study 
finds that there are not significant differences in sentencing outcomes for defendants choosing 
self-representation and those choosing appointed counsel. The article suggests that defendants 
who choose to represent themselves are often motivated by being assigned what they believe to 
be ineffective and resource-limited attorneys. Their alternative would not have necessarily been 
much better to begin with, so there would not be a significant decrease in sentencing harshness 
outcomes (Hashimoto, 2007). 
 
Population Size 
 
This first section uses the populations of each county to determine whether there is an impact on 
harshness in sentencing. I expect that rural counties sentence people harshest and that urban 
counties sentence people more leniently. In rural counties, violent felonies are a much rarer 
occurrence than in urban counties and therefore have a different effect on the community. With 
increased shock value, there is expected to be a harsher punishment. Urban counties may have 
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different moral codes than rural counties that could impact their treatment of defendants in 
sentencing. Also, urban counties have higher risk of jail overcrowding and have to worry about 
going over capacity (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). Population size is operationalized per county as 
opposed to per judicial district because this better serves as an indicator of a rural/urban divide. 
Small counties are grouped together in judicial districts in order to create court systems of 
similar population sizes. 
Lu (2018) attempts to determine whether a sex effect in sentencing exists differently 
between urban and rural counties. Using data from across Pennsylvania from 2003-2010, the 
researcher compares the sentencing outcomes based on courts in communities with different 
population densities. The dataset is noteworthy for its scale; the sample size is over 186,000 
cases from 2003 to 2010. Ultimately, Lu concludes that for the most part the sex disparity is 
consistent across the rural/urban divide. Lu does find evidence, however, that in the smallest 
rural counties there is decreased harshness in length of incarceration for women as opposed to 
men (Lu 2018). The consistency in sentencing disparities found in this study possibly refute the 
idea that there will be differences found in this study based on county population size. 
However, in their previously discussed study, Kramer and Ulmer (2002) find that 
defendants in large urban courts in Pennsylvania are 3.43 times more likely to receive a 
downward departure than defendants in more rural courts. Additionally, medium counties are 1.8 
times likelier to give a downward departure than small counties. This suggests that larger urban 
counties are the most lenient to defendants in sentencing while medium counties are somewhat 
harsher. Smaller rural counties are found to be the harshest for defendants (Kramer and Ulmer, 
2002). 
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Following up on this conclusion, Ulmer and Johnson (2004) investigate court cultures’ 
effects on sentencing outcomes. The study examines data from Pennsylvania and includes many 
of the common variables seen in similar studies. Most notably, the study includes the size of the 
court, the amount of cases each court sees and the incarceration capacity as factors of court 
culture. The results demonstrate that the larger courts sentence defendants less harshly than 
medium and small courts respectively. Also, counties with higher jail capacity sentence 
defendants more harshly. However, in counties that have larger black populations, black people 
were sentenced more harshly. The same trend was observed for Hispanic people as well (Ulmer 
and Johnson, 2004). 
Myers and Talarico (1986) examine sentencing data randomly sampled from Georgia 
between the years 1976 and 1981 to try to determine the effect county’s urbanity has on 
sentencing outcome. Like other similar studies, there is an important distinction between legal 
and extralegal factors that play a role in creating sentencing disparities. It is important to control 
for the differences in types of crime for urban and rural counties. The study operationalizes 
urbanity as a conglomeration of the percent urban according to the 1980 census, population per 
square mile according to the 1980 census, and the overall population number. The authors also 
use court bureaucratization as a control variable; This variable consists of the number of filings 
per judge, the presence of lower court assistance, and the number of probation officers. Creating 
this variable is critical in ensuring that the relationship is not caused by court size instead of 
urbanization. The researchers also control for the crime rate in counties and economic inequality. 
Ultimately, the findings of the study are complex. Urbanization is found to increase the 
harshness imposed on defendants who lack power in society; The likelihood of incarceration 
increases for blacks and decreases for whites when urbanization increases. Urbanization also 
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increases the harshness imposed on younger defendants. The study concludes with the 
determination that overall, urbanization increases sentencing disparities. However, it is worth 
noting that the study examines data from the late 1970s to early 1980s and its application could 
be limited by its old age (Myers and Talarico, 1986). 
Similarly, Austin (1981) uses 1,664 felony cases that resulted in conviction in Iowa to 
determine the effects of urbanization on sentencing outcomes. Much of the original dataset was 
eliminated based on lacking convictions. This study provided the benefit of separating out 
suburban counties as an additional variable. A challenge seemed to be the choice of Iowa for 
study; the state is whiter than average and can prove challenging for determining racial effects. 
Ultimately the study draws several conclusions. Compared to urban counties, suburban counties 
send older people to prison at higher rates. Rural counties send both older people and nonwhite 
people to prison at higher rates (Austin, 1981). 
In their study on socioeconomic status’ impact on sentencing, D’Allesio and Stolzenberg 
(1993) analyze the impact of the urban/rural divide. They find that the type of crime affects the 
way in which the urban/rural factor impacts sentencing outcome. In rural counties, drug 
offenders were sentenced more harshly than in urban counties. On the other hand, sexual 
offenses like incest and sodomy (it was the 1990s) were sentenced more leniently in rural 
counties as opposed to urban counties. The researchers theorize that there is a difference in moral 
code that explains these variations. This theory is limited in its applicability today because the 
theorized moral codes were from over 25 years ago. It is likely that moral codes have changed 
since then in both urban and rural settings. Additionally, specific moral codes may be regional. 
Rural counties in Florida could be different from rural counties in North Carolina. Even with the 
limitations of this study’s urban/rural findings, the theory it proposes has plausibility (D’Allesio 
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and Stolzerberg, 1993). The theory also aids in the continued development of the 
blameworthiness theory because D’Allesio and Stolzernberg (1993) find that different regions 
have different concepts of who blameworthy defendants are. 
 
Political Context 
 
There will likely be some variation among judicial districts. Some of that variation is expected to 
be caused by the political leaning of the localities. In North Carolina, judges and District 
Attorneys are elected within these judicial districts, thereby becoming political figures subject to 
elections and the will of the people. It is also clear that Democrats and Republicans have 
different views when it comes to criminal justice (Chammah, 2016). Therefore, this study will 
examine the effect of districts’ political context – measured by the share of Trump vote in the 
2016 presidential election – as a variable of the political context for each district. Based on the 
prior research, it is expected that defendants in higher Republican districts will receive harsher 
sentences. This outcome is expected because of conservative ideas of individual responsibility 
for one’s actions and their general outlook on criminal justice policies and blameworthiness. 
 Huang et al. (1996) investigate the question of the impact of political context on 
sentencing outcomes. The researchers use data of violent felonies in Georgia between 1981 and 
1989. The study uses presidential elections at the time to operationalize the political leaning of 
the locality. Also, caseload size and court location, among other factors, are used to further 
specify the judicial district and account for legal factors that could explain the variation in 
sentencing between judicial districts. The results of the study demonstrate clearly that increases 
in the Republicanism of the district lead to increases in sentencing harshness. The only 
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exceptions to this that were found were for homicide and rape cases. The researchers theorize 
that these offenses are viewed so negatively and blameworthy in both political contexts, that 
sentencing is not significantly different. In addition, when researchers created an interaction 
variable with conservatism and number of convictions, they found evidence that for some crimes 
more Republican districts sentence defendants with more convictions harsher than those with 
fewer; The gap between defendants with more convictions and defendants fewer convictions 
grows. The researchers explain this variation by the nature of robbery having a wider range of 
consequences than violent crimes. Some robberies are large while others are less serious (Huang 
et al., 1996). 
 In their study, Helms and Jacobs (2002) look at 337 jurisdictions in seven states across 
the country to determine if politics explains disparities in harshness of sentencing. The findings 
of the study do indicate that the political context plays a role in creating sentencing disparities. 
Mainly, in districts that are largely Republican (often those that believe in law-and-order 
policies), the race effect is greater; black defendants are sentenced disproportionately harsher 
than white defendants. Similarly, men are found to be sentenced harsher in more conservative 
areas (Helms and Jacobs, 2002). Following up on this study, Helms and Costanza (2010), which 
will be discussed further in the following section, find similar results supporting the significance 
of political context in sentencing. 
 
Judicial District Racial Composition 
 
A final location factor that is expected to have an impact on sentencing harshness is the judicial 
district’ racial demographic composition. North Carolina’s counties racial makeup is not 
perfectly corelated with population size. For example, among urban counties the white 
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population in Durham County is 42% as opposed to Wake County, which is 62% white. 
Meanwhile among counties with smaller populations, Robeson County has a 27% white 
population3 while Clay County is 95% white (Carolina Population Center, n.d.). Variation of 
racial composition will likely have an impact on the way that the race effect occurs in the county. 
Since the court system like the District Attorney and judges are beholden to the public through 
elections, the racial demographics likely impact the makeup of key players in the criminal justice 
system. For the purpose of this study, racial demographics are combined within judicial districts 
because judicial elections happen within districts. It is theorized that different racial composition 
leads to the election of officials with more representative criminal justice ideologies. The concept 
of blameworthiness is expected to be altered. It is therefore necessary to investigate the effect of 
racial composition based on judicial districts as opposed to counties. Based on the limited studies 
that have been conducted on this topic, it is expected that judicial districts with larger minority 
populations will sentence defendants, particularly black defendants, less harshly. In addition, the 
districts with larger minority populations will sentence defendants more equitably across the race 
factor. 
 Helms and Costanza (2010) attempt to understand the effect of racial composition of 
counties based on a dataset of felony drug cases from 1990. The population of blacks in counties 
was found, and the natural log values were used in the study. The data investigated in the study is 
from seven different states across the country; the states are not easily able to be grouped based 
on any factor. The study also employs legal and extralegal factors as controls. In addition to 
looking at the black population in each county, the study also uses data that identifies the percent 
                                                          
3 Robeson County has the highest American Indian population in North Carolina at 38%. Unfortunately, sentencing 
harshness experienced by Native Americans was unable to be studied in this essay because of population size. 
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Republican vote in each county to incorporate the political factor. Both the racial composition 
and political context variables are particularly examined under the condition that the defendant is 
black; This allows the study to look at the effect of the political and racial composition of 
localities on black defendants as opposed to defendants of all racial groups. Ultimately, the study 
finds that black defendants in higher Republican areas are sentenced more harshly than other 
types of defendants. In addition, black defendants are treated disproportionately harsher in 
counties with a smaller percentage of nonwhite people (Helms and Costanza, 2010). However, as 
was previously discussed, Ulmer and Johnson (2004) find the opposite. They show that counties 
with larger black populations sentence black defendants harsher than counties with smaller black 
populations (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). 
 
4.1b Legal Factors 
 
Unlike identity characteristics, legal factors can lead to disparities in sentencing. People with a 
larger history of criminal activity are able to be sentenced differently than people with a smaller 
criminal activity. Similarly, people who commit a more serious crime are able to be sentenced 
differently. North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing Policy accounts for these legal factors by 
codifying them into the sentencing grids. Horizontally, the sentencing grids account for prior 
criminal history through ranges of prior record points. Vertically, the grids sort crimes based on 
offense levels determined by the Sentencing Commission. 
 
Prior Criminal Record Points and Offense Severity 
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The two legal factors for disparity in sentencing outcomes, prior criminal record points and 
offense severity, will be discussed together because they work in similar ways. Additionally, 
much of the prior research looks at both variables’ joint impacts on sentencing. As was discussed 
in section three on background, prior criminal record points and offense severity are the only 
legal factors for sentencing discernment. These two factors are baked into the sentencing law in 
the punishment grid as the two variables that make up the grid’s rows and columns (NCJS, 
2018).  Defendants charged with higher offense classes are eligible for longer sentences because 
the Commission determined which crimes were more severe than others. The logic is that worse 
crimes like murder deserve more serious punishments than more minor crimes like 
pickpocketing. Similarly, defendants with more prior criminal record points are eligible for 
longer sentences. The Commission viewed prior criminal record as a determinant of future risk 
to society and evidence of incorrigibility. All in all, the Commission found that offense 
classification and prior criminal record were the factors that legally represent a defendant’s 
blameworthiness (Lubitz, 1993). 
Many of the previously discussed studies control for the defendant’s prior criminal history 
and offense class. These studies proved that having a more extensive prior record and higher 
offense class lead to larger punishments overall (Albonetti, 1997; Bickle and Peterson, 1991; 
Brennan, 2008). Clearly, these two factors play a significant role in determining the length of 
sentencing, but what role do they play in the harshness relative to the defendant’s risk? Two 
studies provide detailed results on prior criminal record and offense class’ impact on sentencing 
harshness in the form of upward and downward departures.4 Kramer and Ulmer (2002) focus on 
                                                          
4 Upward and downward departures are not available in North Carolina. They are different than aggravating, 
presumptive, and mitigating ranges, and they can be used as a measure of harshness more similar to the harshness 
variable used in this study than sentencing months used in prior research. 
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offense class and criminal history in their study to determine these factors’ impacts on sentencing 
outcomes. The study finds that for Pennsylvania’s violent offenders, having a larger prior record 
makes the defendant more likely to receive a downward departure. For every additional prior 
criminal record point a defendant has, they are 1.3 times more likely to receive a downward 
departure. Additionally, for every single level increase in the offense class, the odds that a 
defendant receives a downward departure (a less harsh outcome) increases by a magnitude of 
1.5. However, when an interaction variable between criminal history and offense severity was 
created, it was found that there is a reduced likelihood of downward departure. The researchers’ 
findings suggest that defendants in a higher offense class who have fewer points are likelier to 
receive more lenient outcomes (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). 
In a somewhat contradictory study, Hamilton (2017) determines that in the federal system, 
having a larger criminal record leads to higher rates of upward departure (harsh outcome for 
defendant). Hamilton also finds that increased offense classification leads to higher levels of 
upward departure in the federal system (Hamilton, 2017). Clearly, the research on this topic does 
not paint a clear picture of either legal factor’s effects on harshness. Most studies simply include 
these factors as controls, and the operationalization of their dependent variables do not allow for 
studying these factor’s effects on proportional harshness. 
While it is difficult to rectify these seemingly conflicting studies, there are two important 
differences between their designs that could explain their results. First, the locality and court 
types are different. The federal court potentially sentences with different disparities than a state 
court like that of Pennsylvania. Additionally, while Kramer and Ulmer (2002) focus on 
downward departures as a measure of sentencing leniency, Hamilton (2017) focuses on upward 
departures as a measure of sentencing harshness. There is potential for the different results to 
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have been caused by the fact that one study measures leniency while the other study focuses on 
harshness. Perhaps higher offense classes and prior criminal record points lead to more polarized 
harshness outcomes. Ultimately, out of these studies, Kramer and Ulmer (2002) is more directly 
relevant to my research because of its focus on a state court and state crimes rather than federal 
court. Therefore, it is expected that defendants with more prior criminal record points and those 
with higher offense classes will be sentenced harsher because of their increased perceived 
blameworthiness.  
This essay does not use offense class in the regressions because it is baked into the 
harshness index through the risk equations, as will be discussed in the methods section. One of 
the two models included uses three regressions to test for sentencing outcomes grouped into 
three sections based on a defendant’s risk level. This study extensively examines the impact of 
prior criminal record points on the harshness experienced in sentencing as an independent 
variable in most regressions.  
 
4.1c Semi-Legal Factor 
 
Previously, I have stated that the only legally permissible factors for variation in sentencing were 
prior criminal record and offense severity. This is true in the sense that the North Carolina’s 
sentencing grid enumerates these factors specifically as legal factors for distinction in 
sentencing, but offenders are also permitted to be sentenced differently based on plea type. I 
define plea type as a semi-legal factor because a judge cannot directly sentence someone more 
harshly because they choose to go to trial. After all, a fair trial is guaranteed under the 
Constitution. However, plea deals allow people to be sentenced to lesser prison terms than they 
would have risked if they had gone to trial. Taking a plea deal is an exchange for the defendants’ 
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cooperation, which saves the government resources they would have had to spend on a trial. The 
prosecution can legally decide to pursue lesser charges or a shorter sentence (Markham, 
Improper Consideration, 2010). This section will discuss literature and the resulting hypothesis 
and theory about the semi-legal factor, plea type. 
 
Plea Type 
 
Based on the following literature, it is expected that pleading not guilty will result in harsher 
sentencing outcomes because of a trial penalty. There are several theories as to why this outcome 
is expected. Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2009) list seven reasons: defendants are rewarded 
for complying with law enforcement officials, accepting responsibility, reducing the possibility 
of perjury, limiting the court from hearing negative findings about the defendant, determining 
that traditional sentences would be too harsh by the prosecutor, minimizing fears by the 
prosecutor that they will lose their case at trial, and rewarding the maximization of efficiency in 
an increasingly busy criminal justice system. All of these theories ultimately support a broader 
theory of blameworthiness being a cause for the court to impose harsher punishment.  
 Albonetti (1997) examines the role of plea bargaining in the federal system’s sentencing 
laws. Her research emphasizes an investigation of how plea bargains interact with the race factor 
in order to determine whether there is disparity in the type of defendants that benefit from plea 
deals. Looking at over 14,000 federal drug cases, Albonetti (1997) first determines that race and 
sex play a role in sentencing. White people are sentenced less harshly than black and Hispanic 
people, and women are sentenced more leniently than men. The study also proves that departures 
from the guidelines have a more significant effect on sentencing disparities than plea deals. This 
47 
 
finding is difficult to generalize onto the North Carolina system, which does not have the same 
mechanism for downward or upward departures. What is clear is that guilty pleas do play a role 
in sentencing disparities. The final important finding of this study is that the guilty pleas do not 
have a significantly difference impact across racial groups. According to the research pleas do 
not cause a racial disparity: rather, pleas are a more universal phenomenon (Albonetti, 1997).  
 Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2009) attempts to determine whether there is a 
sentencing disparity between defendants who choose to go to trial and those who plead guilty. 
Federal cases from 2000-2002 were used to identify whether the system disproportionately 
rewarded defendants for taking plea deals. The researchers’ study combines a quantitative review 
with 308 qualitative interviews with federal judges. The qualitative element of the study had 
important findings. 65% of the federal judges the researchers interviewed said that they view a 
guilty plea as demonstrating remorse. The study also states that the disparities that exist because 
of plea deals begin much earlier than sentencing. Certain factors make it more likely for a 
defendant to feel pressured to take a plea deal. The study’s results demonstrate that going to trial 
can create a penalty for defendants when it comes to sentencing. The trial penalty does interact 
with race and prior criminal history variables. Researchers found that black defendants are 
slightly better off when it comes to the penalty of the trial, a difference from prior research. 
Additionally, defendant’s with larger criminal records experience more leniency in terms of trial 
penalties. A theory suggested for these results is that trials humanize the defendant. The article 
also suggests that there is perhaps a difference between federal and state judges when it comes to 
sentencing and race. Ultimately, the main takeaway from the study affirms the hypothesis that 
people are punished for pursuing their right to a trial should they be found guilty (Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnston, 2009). 
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 King, Soulé, Steen, and Weidner (2005) assess the differences in sentencing based on 
whether the defendant opts for a jury trial, bench trial, or plea deal. The researchers’ study 
looked at five states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, Washington, Kansas, and Minnesota) to 
determine whether a trial penalty existed. These states were selected based on characteristics that 
made them compatible with the research question. Each had structured sentencing, a sufficient 
mix of bench trials and jury trials, and databases that allowed for analysis from 1997 to 2004. 
The article notes that the decision to take a plea deal or to go to trial is not a legal factor in any of 
the states studied. The findings support the presence of a penalty for defendants who decide to go 
to trial, and evidence supports the theory that judges are interested in the cost saving aspect of 
plea deals. The study is not, however, able to make a determination about the difference between 
a bench trial and a jury trial (King, Soulé, Steen, and Weidner, 2005). 
 Ulmer and Bradley (2006) also looks at the differences in sentencing outcomes based on 
a defendant’s choice to take a plea deal or take their case to jury trial. The study uses a more 
specific version of the data from King et al. (2005). Specifically, Ulmer and Bradley (2006) use 
Pennsylvania court data from 1997-2000. The structure of the study is similar to that of Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson (2009). The study finds that as the offense increases in severity, the 
impact of the penalty of trial is greater. This finding is theorized to be caused in part by the 
emotion that a trial creates, particularly for a violent crime. The idea of the trial penalty is found 
to be true in this analysis as well (Ulmer and Bradley, 2006). 
 Specifically looking at North Carolina, Abrams and Feckler (2018) conduct a study 
which determines that pleading guilty leads to less prison time. While the odds of having gone to 
prison are higher for defendants who take a plea deal, sentence lengths are not as long for these 
defendants. The researchers are able to determine these findings through a quantitative analysis 
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of 300,000 cases from North Carolina over a span of 15 years. The study controls for variables 
like identity characteristics, crime-specific factors, and attorney type. Results show that 
defendants who do not plead guilty and lose at trial receive a sentence that is half a year longer 
than comparable defendants who do plead guilty (Abrams and Feckler, 2018). This is a recent 
result with large implications for defendants in North Carolina. 
 Ward (2003) discusses the option of an Alford plea given to defendants. This type of plea 
is available because of the Supreme Court holding in North Carolina v. Alford. An Alford plea 
allows the defendant to plead guilty while maintaining that they did not commit the crime. 
Defendants choose this option because for many reasons such as overwhelming evidence from 
the prosecution or a desire not to go to trial and risk the penalty. Ward (2003) looks at whether 
this type of plea leads to any preferential outcomes in sentencing. Rather than a quantitative 
study, this analysis looks at the history and legacy of the Alford plea to try and understand how 
Alford defendants are treated. Ultimately, the essay argues that defendants who take Alford pleas 
are at odds with a system that places value on remorse and responsibility. This difficulty to 
display remorse puts them at a disadvantage, and they often receive harsher treatment in 
sentencing (Ward, 2003). 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
 
Considering the prior research and theories, I posit the following hypotheses: 
H1. If the defendant is black, then the sentencing outcome will be harsher than if the 
defendant is white. 
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H2. If the defendant is a man, then the sentencing outcome will be harsher than if the 
defendant is a woman. 
H3. If the defendant is a black man, they will be sentenced harshest, followed by white 
men and black women respectively. White women will be sentenced least harshly. 
H4. If the defendant is middle aged, then the sentencing outcome will be harsher than if 
the defendant is very young or very old. The youngest defendants will receive the least 
harsh sentencing outcomes. 
H5. If the defendant is represented by a public defender, then the sentencing outcome 
will be harsher than if the defendant is represented by a private attorney. If the defendant 
is represented by a court appointed attorney, then the sentencing outcome will be harsher 
than if the defendant is represented by a public defender. Being self-represented will 
produce comparably harsh outcomes to being represented by a court appointed private 
attorney. 
H6. If the defendant lives in a more rural county (a county with a smaller population 
size), then the sentencing outcome will be harsher than if the defendant lives in an urban 
county. 
H7: North Carolina’s thirty district courts are expected to have some random variation in 
sentencing outcomes. 
H8: If the defendant case takes place in a more Republican district, then the sentencing 
outcome will be harsher than if the defendant was sentenced in a more Democratic 
district. 
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H9: If the defendant’s case takes place in a district with a smaller minority (larger white) 
population, then the sentencing outcome will be harsher than if the defendant was 
sentenced in a district with a larger minority (smaller white) population. 
H10. If the defendant has a larger criminal history, then the sentencing outcome will be 
harsher than if the defendant has a smaller criminal history. 
H11. If the defendant is convicted of a higher-level offense, then the sentencing outcome 
will be harsher than if the defendant is convicted of a lower level offense. 
H12. If the defendant pleads not guilty, then they will be treated harsher than if they were 
to take a guilty plea. 
 
5 Data and Research Approach 
The data analyzed in this study is from the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts’ 
(NCAOC) database, which collects data on every criminal case in North Carolina. The sample 
was narrowed down to cases taking place between October 1, 2013 and December 31, 2017. The 
October date was selected because the updated felony punishment grid went into effect on that 
date. While the grid did not change significantly, some of the offense classifications of certain 
crimes were adjusted.  
Of the NCAOC database, only defendants who had been charged with high-level felonies 
(classes A-D) were selected. Filtering the database like this limited the sample to defendants who 
were only facing prison time. Defendants convicted of A-D level felonies can only receive active 
prison punishments under North Carolina law. The Class A felony distinction is exclusively for 
first-degree murder cases. Class B1 felonies include second degree murder and serious sexual 
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offenses. Class B2 felonies include some second-degree murders, attempted murders, attempted 
sexual assaults, and human trafficking of children. There are many Class C felonies like serious 
assaults, manufacturing methamphetamines, and some serious property crimes. Finally, Class D 
felonies are crimes such as arson, manslaughter, some second-degree sexual assaults, and more 
robberies and property crimes. While all these crimes are different in nature, they have been 
grouped by the Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission into standardized classes. These 
groupings allow for comparisons and standardization even when the types of crimes are 
incredibly different. All of the offenses are serious and are associated with long prison sentences. 
Cases were also dropped if they had not been closed. The incomplete cases were 
determined by sorting for those that did not have a date of disposition. After removing cases in 
which the defendant was not charged with an A-D level felony and those that were incomplete, 
cases in which the defendant was not black or white were removed. Ultimately, these methods 
created an overall sample of 9,836 total cases. As will be discussed below, a few regressions 
were conducted for analysis. In Model 1 approximately 3,800 cases were removed from the 
analysis because they were missing data about attorney type. The attorney type was recorded in 
two sections of the NCAOC database: CRRDAT (District Court) and CRRSAT (Superior Court). 
Some of the data was contradictory, but there were more values present in the District Court 
column. Therefore, for the purposes of this study I chose to use only District Court data. 
However, doing so decreased the sample size to 6,040 cases. 
 A harshness variable was created by comparing the outcome of the punishment with the 
associated risk. Risk was determined by creating five risk equations, one for each prior criminal 
record point grouping on the punishment grid (see Figure1). In each risk equation, the largest 
number of months to which a defendant could be sentenced was selected from the aggravating 
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range for each offense class level. These values were multiplied by the variable that showed how 
many cases of each type for which a defendant was charged. For A level felonies which are only 
eligible for the death penalty or life without parole, a value of 1200 months (100 years) was 
assigned. The five risk formulas at each prior criminal record level were added to create a 
conglomerate risk factor. The real punishment the defendant received was divided by the risk 
factor to find the harshness outcome. Figure 4 shows a spike plot graphing the distribution of 
sentencing harshness for the cases observed in Models 1 and 2, which will be described later. 
The harshness indexes are rounded to the nearest five. The spike plot demonstrates two clear 
spikes at 15 and 80. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of harshness outcomes; N=6,040 
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 There are several independent variables included in this analysis. First, prior criminal 
record points were sorted into groups based on the ranges presented in the punishment grid. A 
number between zero and five is assigned to each of the ranges with zero representing the 
smallest prior criminal record point range and five representing the largest prior criminal record 
point range. Figure 5, displayed below, shows the frequency of cases in which the defendant is in 
each of the prior criminal record point levels. Clearly, there is a general decline in frequency of 
cases in the ranges as the point level increases. However, there is an increase in the number of 
defendants in the 18+ point range (5). Prior points as real numbers are included directly in the 
NCAOC database, and the variable is named “crdprpt.” 
 
Figure 5. Frequency of cases at each prior criminal record level (N=6,040) 
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assigned a number between zero and three (guilty to lesser = 0, guilty = 1, not guilty = 2, and 
Alford = 3). Table 1 shows the frequency of each type of plea for the dataset that includes 
attorney-type. It is important to note that only 4.72% of the cases included chose to plead not 
guilty. A second variable was also created by grouping plea types as either a guilty plea (guilty to 
lesser, guilty, and Alford) and not guilty plea. This new variable was named “LB_plea2.” 
 
 
 
Table 1. Frequency of the types of pleas 
 
 Third, variables for the identity characteristics, race and sex, were created. The race 
variable (LB_RaceBW) groups black and white defendants (white = 0, black = 1). The sex 
variable (LB_Sex) was also created (female = 0, male = 1). A race/sex interaction variable was 
made, and each of the four categories were assigned a number between zero and three based on 
expected harshness (white women = 0, black women = 1, white men = 2, black men = 3). This 
variable was named “LB_RG4.” While fewer women commit A-D level felonies in North 
Carolina, there are enough observations to draw statistically significant results. The group with 
the fewest observations, black women (1), still has over 200 cases. 
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 Fourth, an age variable was operationalized in two ways. One variable (LB_AgeatCrime) 
is the real number age based on the defendant’s date of birth and the date the defendant was 
charged with the offense. The other operationalization (AgeGroup) creates age ranges to sort the 
defendants. The ranges are as follows: 15-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, and 50+. There are enough 
cases within each group to have valid observations. North Carolina, until very recently, 
automatically tried all 16-year-olds as adults, making them eligible for sentencing under North 
Carolina’s structured sentencing program (Powell, 2017). Figure 6 displays the distribution of 
ages present in this study. Clearly, there is a rightward skew to the age distribution; most A-D 
level felonies are committed by young adults. 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of ages of defendants studied; N=6,040 
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 Fifth, as discussed above, attorney type is included as an independent variable. The 
NCAOC database includes four types of legal representation a defendant is eligible to have: 
privately retained attorneys, public defenders, court appointed attorneys, and defendants who 
waive their right to an attorney and to self-represent. Each type of attorney was assigned a 
number between zero and three based on the expected harshness outcome (Private = 0, Public 
Defender = 1, Court Appointed Private Attorney = 2, Self-representation = 3). Few defendants 
waive their right to an attorney, but there are enough observations to support this method of 
grouping.  
 Sixth, judicial districts were included as a control. A map of the District Courts effective 
January 1, 2015 was used, and county codes from the NCAOC database was assigned to its 
respective district (Drennan, 2014). In North Carolina, there are some districts with multiple 
sections (ex. 9, 9A, and 9B). Some of the functions of the court belong to the individually 
lettered districts, but some of the power belongs to the overall district (Judicial Department; 
2008). Two of these districts cut counties into two sections. For this reason, the lettered districts 
were consolidated into single districts in this study. Overall, there are 30 judicial districts 
included in this analysis. See Map 1 for reference on the judicial districts. 
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Map 1. North Carolina District Court Districts. For the purposes of this study, lettered districts 
were consolidated. District numbers only were used. (Drennan, 2014) 
 
 
 Seventh, the population of each county is included as an independent variable. The 
county populations were found from US Census data from the 2010 census. The data was 
matched with the cases’ respective county using fips codes, and the new variable was named 
“pop2010.” Population was not used at the district level because the theory behind population is 
that there is are cultural differences between rural and urban areas which impact their definitions 
of blameworthiness. Because judicial districts group counties of lower population levels, finding 
the population for the district overall would nullify the urban/rural effect. 
 Eighth, political context is operationalized as the Trump share of the vote in each district. 
Dr. Baumgartner provided data listing the Trump vote share per county in North Carolina. Using 
the county population totals, the total vote share was able to be determined for each district. The 
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Trump vote share for each district was named as the variable “TrumpDistrictShare.” This 
variable was imported into the dataset for analysis. 
 Finally, the district’s racial composition is included. Based on US Census Bureau data 
obtained from the Carolina Population Center, the county’s racial demographics were able to be 
discerned. The variable named “PctWhiteDistrict” was created by finding the aggregate 
percentage of white people in each judicial district. The final three location variables that I 
discussed (population, Trump share, and percent white) were not run in the regressions at the 
same time as the judicial district because they cancel each other out. 
The effects of offense class are imbedded into the way that harshness is assessed. 
Therefore, there was no need to include offense class as a separate variable in my regressions. 
Table 2 (see appendix) describes the operationalization of each of the variables. 
 
6 Results 
 
6.1 Regressions 
 
Many regressions were run for the analysis included in this study. In this section, two Models 
will be included as figures of focus. The remaining regressions are available in the appendix for 
reference. The first regression included in this section was run using the independent variables, 
race-sex interaction, age group, judicial district, prior points, attorney type, and plea type. This 
regression (Model 1) is the best indicator of the results. Many other regressions were run, but the 
main findings displayed in Model 1 were generally consistent across the regressions. The results 
of the first regression are displayed below: 
60 
 
 
 
 
Model 1. Includes variables, Race x Sex, Age Groupings, Attorney Type, Judicial District, Prior 
Criminal Record Points, and Plea Type); N = 6,040 
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 The second model was run in order to observe the results of the regression for different 
ranges of defendants’ risk. The risk variable was separated by generating a new variable 
(LB_RiskL) and cutting the data into four categories based on the distribution of risk scores. The 
minimum risk that defendants face if they are charged with an A-D level felony is 80 months in 
prison. This is the number of months a defendant is sentenced to if the defendant has 0-1 prior 
criminal record points, is convicted of a D-level felony, and receives the highest end of the 
aggravated range. Three regressions were run, one for defendants with the lowest risk of people 
facing A-D charges, one for defendants facing lower risk, one for defendants with medium risk, 
and one for defendants with the largest risk. The ranges of risk used in Model 2 are 80-120 
months in prison, 120-185 months, and over 185 months. The same independent variables were 
included in Model 2 as in Model 1. The regressions included in Model 2 are included below, and 
they are labeled Regression 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3: 
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Regression 2.1 Low Risk Defendants (Facing 80-120 months in prison); N=3,004 
  
l    
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Regression 2.2 Medium Risk Defendants (facing 120-185 months in prison); N=1,551 
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Regression 2.3 High Risk Defendants (facing over 185 months in prison); N=1,485 
 
 
Model 2. Three regressions grouping common risk factors (low, medium, and high) 
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6.2 Interpreting Results 
 
Model 1 presents findings that are supported by other regressions, indicating robustness. 
Additionally, the model’s R-squared value of 0.63 shows that the data is somewhat well 
predicted by the model. There are a few key differences between Models 1 and 2, which is why 
both are included in this study. Model 2 presents three regressions, Regression 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. 
There are slight variations between the results presented in these three regressions and Model 1, 
and these will be discussed below. The three regressions have smaller sample sizes because the 
data from which they derive are subsets of Model 1’s data. However, the regressions maintain 
consistently strong R-squared values, demonstrating that the model predicts the outcome of 
sentencing harshness well like Model 1. 
 First, one of the most important findings is the substantial role that prior criminal record 
points play in harshness outcomes in sentencing. This study finds that for A-D felonies, for every 
single level increase in prior criminal record points, there is a 5% decrease in the harshness 
outcome. Defendants who have higher criminal record levels may be sentenced to longer prison 
terms, but the sentences they receive are increasingly more lenient compared with the sentence 
they were at risk of receiving. This finding is consistent between Model 1 and Model 2. Model 3 
(see appendix) displays a regression with showing the results for each prior criminal record point 
category to see whether this 5% decrease in harshness was consistent across the punishment 
grid’s point levels. This model finds that the 5% decrease in harshness is consistent. As a 
defendant moves up each prior criminal record category, as defined by the punishment grid, they 
are sentenced 5% less harshly than they would have been at the lower level. 
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 Second, an important finding of the study is that the type of plea defendants take has 
statistically significant impacts on the harshness outcome. In both models, pleading guilty to 
lesser is used as the baseline (GL = 0) for analysis. It is found that defendants who simply plead 
guilty (GU = 1) are sentenced about 46% harsher than defendants who plead guilty to lesser.5 
Additionally, it is found that defendants who plead not guilty (NG = 2) are sentenced 
approximately 36% harsher than those who take a guilty to lesser plea. Finally, some defendants 
choose an Alford plea, maintaining that they are not guilty of the crime but choosing to plead 
guilty for whatever reason they may have. These defendants are found to be sentenced 
approximately 18% harsher than those who plead guilty to lesser. Overall, the findings suggest 
that defendants who plead guilty to lesser receive the least harsh sentences relative to what they 
were at risk of receiving. Defendants who plead guilty receive the harshest sentences relative to 
the amount they were potentially eligible to receive. The ranking of harshness outcomes from 
least to greatest being guilty to lesser, Alford plea, not guilty, and guilty is consistent across 
regressions (see appendix).  
 Another regression (see Model 4 in the appendix) was run comparing the harshness 
outcomes for two groups of pleas: defendants who take guilty pleas of any type (guilty, guilty to 
lesser, and Alford pleas). The findings demonstrate that defendants who plead not guilty are 
sentenced 14% harsher than those who take any type of guilty plea. 
 Model 1 displays interesting results about identity characteristics. Both models use white 
women (0) as the baseline. Model 1 finds that white men (2) receive significantly harsher 
sentences by a factor of 2.2%. This effect seems small when compared to the impact of prior 
                                                          
5 For the purposes of this analysis, coefficients from Model 1 will be used. The coefficients are not far from those 
found in Model 2. The most important aspect of this finding is the consistent order of outcome harshness. 
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criminal record points and plea type, but there is still found to be a statistically significant 
disparity in the harshness with which the criminal justice system treats white men as opposed to 
white women. For high level felonies with long prison terms that span many months, even small 
percentage changes in harshness can have lengthy implications. There are not found to be 
statistically significant results for black men and black women. This outcome indicates that for 
high level felonies in North Carolina, black men and black women are not treated statistically 
harsher than white women. These race/sex findings are consistent across the various regressions 
conducted, demonstrating robustness. 
 Model 2’s results about the race/sex interaction are important to compare to Model 1’s 
findings. While most of the regressions overall yield results similar to those found in Model 1, 
the three regressions in Model 2 show different race-sex interaction results than Model 1. For 
defendants with low risk and medium risk, there is not found to be any statistically significant 
disparity in harshness experienced based on the race-sex interaction term. However, for 
defendants facing the largest risk outcomes, the disparity between white men and white women 
is very statistically significant, and the coefficient is nearly quadrupled to an 8.2% increase in 
harshness outcomes for white men. This result means that white men facing charges that could 
lead to 80-185 months in prison do not have a statistically significant difference in harshness 
outcomes than white women. However, white men who are eligible for over 185 months in 
prison are sentenced over 8% harsher than white women. 
 There is some evidence that race may play a role in sentencing harshness. Model 5 (see 
appendix) was run to separate the race/sex interaction variable and focus on the race and sex 
impact individually. The impact of sex is not found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The race factor is significant, and it shows that black defendants are sentenced 1.2% harsher than 
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their white counterparts. However, the interaction variable is a better way to evaluate the impact 
of race and gender because it is more intersectional. Defendants do not enter a court room as one 
factor or the other. Rather, defendants present themselves to the court the collective sum of both 
race and sex. 
The study also finds statistically significant results relating to age of the defendant. There 
is found to be an increase in harshness of sentencing as the defendant gets older. For Model 1, 
among the four age groups (20-30, 30-40, 40-50, and 50+), three were found to be significantly 
different than defendants who are under 20. Defendants who are aged 20-30 are found to be 
sentenced 1.2% harsher than the youngest defendants. There are not statistically significant 
results found for defendants aged 30-40. 40-50-year-olds are found to be sentenced 2.2% harsher 
than defendants who were under 20. Finally, the oldest defendants, those above the age of 50, are 
found to be sentenced 2% harsher than the youngest defendants. Model 1’s results support the 
hypothesis that there is a curvilinear relationship between age and sentencing harshness, with the 
youngest defendants sentenced least harshly out of any of the age groups and the oldest 
defendant sentenced slightly less harshly than the middle-aged group (40-50). However, this 
leniency towards the oldest defendants is small and is somewhat fragile. The findings which is 
clear and robust is that overall, older defendants are sentenced harsher than the youngest 
defendants.  
Models 2 demonstrates important results for age that is slightly different than Model 1. 
These regressions find that among defendants with medium (120-185 months) and high levels 
(185+ months) of risk, there is no statistically significant difference in sentencing harshness 
based on the age of the defendant. The first regression in Model 2, however, shows that for 
defendants with the lowest risk in sentencing (80-120 months), there are statistically significant 
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results relating to age. Defendants with the lowest risk who are 20-30-years-old are sentenced 
2% harsher than defendants who are under 20. Additionally, defendants with the lowest risk who 
are 40-50-years-old are sentenced 4% harsher than those who are under 20. These results 
indicate that most of the disparity based on the defendant’s age occurs for those eligible for 
shorter sentences within the A-D level felony ranges. Model 2 maintains the main takeaway 
finding that the youngest defendants are sentenced the most leniently. 
Age is an interesting variable to examine because it is expected that it would interact with 
the prior criminal record points of the defendant. Surely the older a defendant is, the higher the 
likelihood that they have a larger number of prior criminal record points. Multiple regressions 
were run removing prior criminal record points in order to test the robustness of the age findings. 
Were the findings simply a result of prior record points, or is age really a factor in sentencing?  
One such regression, Model 6 (see appendix), ran the test assuming that prior criminal 
record points were nonexistent in North Carolina’s sentencing policy. The risk equation counted 
every defendant’s possible maximum sentence as if they had zero prior criminal record points. 
Using this new risk variable, harshness was determined similarly to the other regressions. The 
prior points variable was included as a control in the form “crdprpt,” which lists the real number 
of points a defendant has as opposed to the grouping on the punishment grid. This choice was 
made because assuming every defendant was sentenced under the guidelines for zero prior 
criminal record points removed the impact of the point groupings according to the sentencing 
grid. Ultimately, only one of the three age groups were still found to be significant at the 0.05 
level. 40-50-year-old defendants are found to be sentenced 2.2% harsher than those under 20. 
Two of the other age groups (30-40 and 50+) were found to be significant at the 0.1 level only. 
The 50+ age group had a significant of 0.054, making it marginally significant. The results of 
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this model show a harsher impact coefficient for each age group, but it runs into the issue of 
significance. Clearly, the age effect in sentencing is largely fueled by prior points, but there still 
seems to be some effect that allows younger defendants slightly more leniency. The problem of 
age and prior criminal record points is displayed in Table 3 below. The youngest defendants, 
aged 15-20, do not often fall in the medium-high point ranges (3 and 4). Only three such 
defendants were observed in these two prior criminal record point categories. This fact has the 
potential to impact the findings of the study because not many observations are able to be used as 
comparisons for the youngest age group for defendants with high levels of prior points. 
 
 
Table 3. Frequency of defendants in each age group with each level of prior criminal  
record points 
 
A control for judicial district shows that while most districts are found to not be 
statistically significant in the variation harshness, there are a few districts which are consistently 
statistically significant. For this analysis, the district numbers presented in the regressions 
correspond with the real judicial district numbers in 2015. District 1, located in the northeastern 
corner of the state, serves as the baseline because of numerical order. District 4 punishes 
defendants 5.75% harsher compared to District 1. District 4 is comprised of Duplin, Jones, 
Onslow, and Sampson Counties, and it is in the southeastern section of the state. Two districts, 7 
and 8, sentence their defendants significantly more leniently than District 1. District 7 sentences 
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defendants 6.67% more leniently, and District 8 sentences defendants 5.95% more leniently than 
District 1. District 7 includes of Edgecombe, Nash, and Wilson Counties, and is located just 
northeast of the Triangle. District 8 is comprised of Greene, Lenoir, and Wayne Counties and is 
located just south of District 7. All of these districts are in the Eastern half of the state between 
the Triangle and the beach. See Map 1 as reference of the judicial districts. 
Regressions were run with the other location factors (county population, political context, 
and racial composition) instead of the judicial districts (see Model 7 in the appendix). None of 
the regressions yielded statistically significant results. The county’s population yielded 
marginally significant results (significant at the 0.1 level but not the 0.05 level). However, these 
results demonstrated a coefficient extremely close to zero. Ultimately, it is fair to say that the 
county’s population (a measure of the urban/rural divide), the district’s political context 
(operationalized as the share of the Trump vote), and the district’s racial composition 
(operationalized as the percent white), have no significant impact on the harshness experienced 
at sentencing. 
 
7 Discussion  
 This study expands on prior literature through its scope, its different method of 
operationalizing sentencing harshness, and its various independent variables. Very little prior 
research has investigated North Carolina’s structured sentencing policy quantitatively. The 
research in this study builds off the few studies that analyze sentencing disparities in North 
Carolina (Horton, 2005; Brennan, 2008; Abrams and Feckler, 2018), and this study expands on 
their scope by looking at the highest-level felonies specifically. The operationalization of 
sentencing harshness outcome allows for improved analysis of North Carolina’s system. While 
72 
 
most of the prior studies have operationalized sentencing outcomes as whether the defendant 
received active imprisonment and how many months they received, this study takes an approach 
that allows for better comparisons across types of crimes. This study focuses on high A-D level 
felonies, so there are not potential sentences other than active prison time. Additionally, this 
study creates a harshness index in which sentencing outcomes are compared to the risk a 
defendant faced in sentencing.  
 It is difficult to simply compare months of a prison sentence when defendants are 
convicted of different offense classes and when defendants are convicted of more than one 
offense. For example, if a defendant with zero points is charged with two B1-level felonies and 
one D-level felony, they are eligible for up to 680 months in prison. If another defendant with no 
points is charged with one D-level felony, they are eligible for up to 80 months in prison. Yet, if 
the first defendant receives 326 months in prison and the second defendant is sentenced to 70 
months in prison, the first defendant is better off compared with their risk. The first defendant’s 
sentenced was just 48% of their risk. The second defendant did not fare as well and was 
sentenced to 88% of their risk. Clearly, comparing sentencing outcomes this way allows for a 
more individualized approach and creates a better ability to compare outcomes. The harshness 
index provides the ability to analyze wider varieties of crimes at once. 
 In addition to these improvements in methods, this study compares the impact of many 
independent variables on sentencing harshness. While many prior studies focused on a single 
variable of analysis such as race, sex, etc., this study takes a broader approach an includes 
analysis of many potential factors in sentencing. Extralegal factors including identity 
characteristics and location factors are included in analysis. Additionally, legal and semi-legal 
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factors are included. Focusing on many variables in analysis allows for more controls which 
improve the degree to which accuracy and robustness can be assessed. 
 The results of this study suggest that there is a negative relationship between prior 
criminal record points and the harshness with which the court system treats defendants in 
sentencing. The study finds that there is a decrease in 5% harshness with every increase in level 
of prior criminal record point groupings. This is a particularly important finding because it 
indicates that a disparity in harshness exists because of the standardization efforts in North 
Carolina’s structured sentencing laws. As has been discussed in Section 3 of this essay, North 
Carolina’s law creates different columns for sentencing based on ranges of defendants’ prior 
criminal record points. As the number of prior criminal record points increases, the sentencing 
range increases in months to become more severe. The logic behind the law is that offenders who 
reoffend are more likely to be a risk to the community, and they need longer prison sentences to 
try and fix their habit of offending (Lubitz, 1993). However, the findings of the study indicate 
that the court system changes its sentencing practices because of the law. Decreasing harshness 
as prior criminal record points increase does not equate to decreasing sentence lengths. Rather, as 
harshness decreases the sentences defendants receive as opposed to the sentences that they are at 
risk of receiving proportionally decrease. Defendants sentenced at the highest level of prior 
criminal record points (18+ points) are sentenced 25% less harshly than defendants in the lowest 
range of prior criminal record points (0-1).  
 These findings on prior criminal record points are similar to those found in similar studies 
like Kramer and Ulmer (2002), which show that in the federal system, increasing prior criminal 
record points also increases the odds that a defendant receives a downward departure (a less 
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harsh sentence).6 One theory is that the court is less comfortable sentencing defendants to the 
higher end of the sentencing ranges as the number of months in the range increases. It seems that 
the court system does not view defendants with higher prior criminal record point levels as 
having the same blameworthiness as the Commission ascribed them when assigning sentencing 
ranges for various point levels. As a hypothetical example, if two defendants are convicted of 
exactly the same B1 felony, the judge would have to sentence one under a range of 190-240 
months in prison and another 386-483 months. The results of this study indicate that the judge is 
more likely to sentence the defendant with 18+ points closer to the lower end of the range (386 
months), and more likely to sentence the defendant with 0-1 points closer to the upper end of 
their range (240 months). While the structured sentencing law was intended to lengthen the 
sentences of defendants who commit high level crimes and have high levels of prior criminal 
record points, it is found that the court may proportionally lessen the harshness with which 
defendants with higher prior points are sentenced. The findings on prior criminal record points 
were relatively consistent across the three regressions in Model 2, demonstrating that regardless 
of the severity of risk the defendant was facing, the prior point effect was the same. This result 
refutes Kramer and Ulmer’s (2002) finding that offense severity and prior criminal record effects 
were linked.  
 The type of plea is consistently found to be extremely important in determining the 
harshness of outcome. As discussed, if the goal of the defendant is to be sentenced less harshly 
relative to their risk, pleading guilty to lesser is the best option. All other types of pleas result in 
significantly harsher sentencing outcomes. Alford pleas are the next best option. This finding 
                                                          
6 Kramer and Ulmer (2002) shows that individually prior criminal record increases lead to increases in downward 
departure. However, in an interaction variable with offense class, more lenient outcomes decreased. 
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about Alford pleas disagrees with the results of Ward’s (2003) qualitative evaluation of the 
Alford plea. While Ward (2003) suggests that it may be in a defendant’s best interest to simply 
plead guilty rather than use an Alford plea, this study finds that pleading guilty leads to 
defendants receiving the harshest possible outcomes relative to the risk they face. It is probable 
that Ward (2003) combines guilty pleas with guilty to lesser pleas, which may have an impact on 
how the outcomes compare to Alford pleas. 
 Evidence from this study confirms that there is a trial penalty, as was presented in the 
research (King, Soulé, Steen, and Weidner, 2005; Abrams and Feckler, 2018; Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006). While only a few hundred cases included in the sample pled not guilty, there is a 
clear and consistent effect of pleading not guilty. Relative to the risk, the harshness of the 
outcome is only slightly worse than if a defendant were to plead guilty to their actual charges. 
Additionally, Model 4 shows that defendants who plead not guilty are sentenced 14% harsher 
than defendants who take any type of guilty plea overall. The findings about plea deals support 
the hypothesis that defendants who plead not guilty will be worse off. Therefore, all of Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson’s (2009) seven-part theory, which expands upon causes of 
blameworthiness based on plea type, are plausible causes of the sentencing disparity. 
The findings about identity characteristics confirm some hypotheses and contradict 
others. The finding that white men are sentenced harsher than white women relative to their risk 
was largely expected based on the hypothesis that men are sentenced harsher than women 
because of paternalist chivalry (Bickle and Peterson, 1991; Tillyer et al., 2015). However, what 
was unexpected is that white women, black women, and black men are not sentenced 
significantly differently. The findings contradict the hypothesis that overall women will fare 
better in the court system. Additionally, the findings show no relationship between race and 
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sentencing outcomes, even though many prior studies show that black people receive harsher 
sentences than white people (Hamilton, 2017; Mustard, 2001; Kutateladze et al., 2014; Horton, 
2005; Brennan, 2008; Steen et al., 2005; etc.). As is shown in Model 5, separating race and sex 
even shows slightly more lenient outcomes for black people as compared to white people. 
Clearly, this study rejects the hypothesis that black defendants are treated more harshly for A-D 
level felonies in North Carolina. When sex was separated from race in Model 5, however, the 
results were not significant at the 0.05 level. This finding does not allow us to accept the 
hypothesis that men will be sentenced more harshly than women overall. Perhaps because all of 
the defendants in this study are convicted of high-level felonies, the evil woman theory is valid. 
While by itself sex had no significant effect, the combined interaction variable is able to find 
disparity caused by sex, but the result is only present for white defendants. White men are treated 
harshest relative to their risk in A-D level felonies. This finding does not inherently reject the 
theory of blameworthiness. Rather, it necessitates a reevaluation of who North Carolina’s courts 
consider blameworthy. Further exploration at different offense levels would allow for a better 
understanding of whether this phenomenon was consistent. If so, perhaps North Carolina’s courts 
view white men as the most blameworthy category of defendant. 
Based on the analysis, this study confirms the hypothesis that age plays a role in 
sentencing. Findings support the theory that the youngest defendants are viewed as least 
blameworthy and are sentenced least harshly. It was expected that prior criminal record points 
could have an impact on the outcome of the age factor because older people have had more 
opportunities to accrue prior criminal record points. Prior criminal record points do seem to play 
a large role in the sentencing disparity of age. However, there is evidence that age is still 
somewhat responsible for this disparity, and that older defendants are sentenced harsher than the 
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youngest defendants. This study largely confirms the findings from prior research that age is a 
factor in sentencing outcomes, with the youngest offenders being treated more leniently than 
older offenders (Ryon et al., 2017). It is possible that brain development research plays a role in 
the concept of blameworthiness for the age effect because young people are viewed through a 
less harsh lens (MGHCLBB, 2012). 
This study shows that the attorney type does not ultimately affect the harshness outcome 
in sentencing. There was essentially no evidence that the attorney type significantly affected the 
harshness defendants experienced at sentencing. This was a surprising outcome, and it 
contradicted the hypothesis created through the literature review (Anderson and Heaton, 2012; 
Champion 1989). While there are not many prior studies about the impact of attorney type on 
sentencing outcomes, the few I was able to find lent themselves to the hypothesis that my results 
rejected. Rather, this study accepts the results found in Hashimoto (2007) that there is not a 
significant difference between court appointed private attorneys and self-representations. 
However, this study takes that result a step further and finds that there is no statistically 
significant result regardless of the type of attorney retained. The theory behind the attorney 
hypothesis is that the incentive structure causes some attorneys to work harder on cases than 
others. This theory has not been outright disproven because different attorneys may be place 
different effort into their clients’ defenses based on the resources available to them and the 
incentive structure they have. However, in this sample there is no significant effect of the type or 
quality of defense. Future research should pursue this finding at different levels in North 
Carolina to compare. Perhaps this result is only present for cases of A-D level felonies. Overall, 
A-D level defendants are not viewed as more blameworthy based on the type of attorney they 
have. 
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This study presents interesting results about location factors. The regressions showed that 
there is variation in a few judicial districts in sentencing harshness. There are two districts where 
defendants fared better than average and one where defendants were punished more harshly. 
North Carolina’s judicial system, while localized by districts, is supposed to be a state entity that 
operate fairly across the board. The results of this study report that this is overall true. Most 
judicial districts do not sentence A-D level felony defendants significantly differently than each 
other. However, some extralegal variation does exist. The hypothesis that judicial districts would 
sentence defendants with some random variation is largely denied. Out of the thirty districts, 
only three are outliers in sentencing harshness. 
Additionally, the hypotheses about the other location factors were all refuted by this 
study. There is no significant effect found for population, political context, or racial composition. 
This is understandable seeing as the districts are relatively consistent in sentencing harshness 
overall. Generally, this study shows that North Carolina’s courts do not carry out the law 
differently depending on whether they’re urban or rural, Republican or Democratic, and 
predominantly white or less white. This is a promising result for the state to know that the law is 
being carried out relatively consistently. This study shows that blameworthiness of defendants 
does not significantly change based on any of the factors of locality that this study examined. 
Further research could investigate the three districts that do present variation to better understand 
why the disparity exists. 
Future research should continue to quantitatively evaluate North Carolina’s structured 
sentencing system. This study was limited by the scope of the data recorded by the North 
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts. Three important factors in particular were unable 
to be examined because of lacking data. First, colorism has been studied as a factor in sentencing 
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disparities in the past. Burch (2015) uses data from Georgia to investigate skin color’s impact on 
sentencing. Skin color was grouped into three categories: dark skinned, medium skinned, and 
light skinned. Evidence points to the conclusion that colorism plays an important role in the 
sentencing disparity with dark skinned people receiving harsher sentences than those with 
medium skin and those with medium skin receiving harsher sentences than those with light skin. 
This analysis is an expansion of the theory behind race’s impact in sentencing. 
 Second, education level has been available in some studies and has been found to have 
links to sentencing outcomes. Education has been found to have a negative relationship with 
sentence length (Mustard 2001; Brennan 2008; Albonetti 1997). Finally, socioeconomic status 
has been studied in prior research and would be interesting to look at in terms of its effects on 
sentencing harshness. Miethe (1985) found that even after Minnesota passed a structured 
sentencing law, there were still lingering effects through which people of lower socioeconomic 
classes were sentenced more harshly than those of higher socioeconomic classes. D'Allesio and 
Stolzenberg (1993) also studied this phenomenon, finding that the type of crime matters in the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and sentencing outcomes. Ultimately, the researchers 
found that for some crimes, as socioeconomic status increases, sentencing harshness decreases. 
All three of these variables would be interesting to incorporate into further research if they are 
available. 
 
8 Conclusion 
North Carolina’s structured sentencing policy succeeds in its intention of creating relatively 
standardized outcomes based on locality. Clearly, across different courts in North Carolina 
sentencing harshness is consistent except for a few districts. However, there are disparities in 
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harshness are found within the system. Findings on prior criminal record points indicate that 
having lower levels of points is a risk factor for receiving a punishment closer to the highest risk 
possibility for the defendant. The state intended for defendants with higher prior criminal record 
points to be sentenced to longer terms because of their perceived blameworthiness. While this 
study does not refute this phenomenon, it does seem that defendants with higher prior criminal 
record points who are eligible for longer sentences, are receiving proportionally less of those 
sentences. These results indicate that the court subverts the sentencing recommendations 
established by the Commission regarding prior criminal points. Additionally, pleading guilty, 
pleading not guilty, and taking an Alford plea are all risk factors for harsher sentencing compared 
to pleading guilty to lesser. Overall, pleading not guilty is a risk factor compared to any type of 
guilty plea. The importance of the type of plea underscores the power of prosecutors in North 
Carolina’s sentencing. Taking responsibility in the form of a plea does not seem to reduce a 
defendant’s blameworthiness overall though. Rather, taking responsibility to the government’s 
narrative and being eligible for a guilty to lesser plea deal leads to more lenient outcomes. Being 
a white man and being older are also found to be risk factors for harsher outcomes. It is possible 
that North Carolina’s courts view white men as more blameworthy for the crimes of which they 
are convicted. Attorney type does not matter in sentencing harsher. Overall, this study provides 
interesting results that challenge and expand the blameworthiness theory. Most importantly, the 
Commission was successful in baking blameworthiness for defendants charged with higher 
offense classes and prior criminal record points into North Carolina’s sentencing law. And, 
prosecutors have the power to control significant variation in sentencing harshness through the 
types of pleas they offer. 
  
81 
 
References 
 
Abrams, David and Ryan Fackler. 2016. “To plea or not to plea: Evidence from North Carolina.” 
Presented at Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), Atlanta. 1-50. 
http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Documents/seminars/abstracts/June%202,%202016.pd
f 
Albonetti, Celesta A. 1997. “Sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of 
Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug 
Offenses, 1991-1992.” Law & Society Review, 31 (4): 789-822. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3053987 
Anderson, James M. and Paul Heaton. 2012. “How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? 
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes.” The Yale Law Journal, 
122(1): 154-217. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23528652. 
Austin, Thomas L. 1981. “The influence of court location on type of criminal sentence: The 
rural-urban factor.” Journal of Criminal Justice, 9 (4): 305-316. DOI: 10.1016/0047-
2352(81)90003-9. 
Jack Betts, “Meet the New, Conservative Jim Hunt - Facing the First GOP-Controlled State 
House this Century, Even the Democratic Governor Sounds Like a Republican,” 
Charlotte Observer (NC), 22 January, 1995. Available from NewsBank: https://infoweb-
newsbank-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/apps/news/document-
view?p=AMNEWS&docref=news/0F244809F252CE0E (Accessed January 7, 2019). 
Bickle, Gayle S. and Ruth D. Peterson. 1991. “The Impact of Sex-Based Family Roles on 
Criminal Sentencing.” Social Problems, 38 (3): 372-394. DOI: 10.2307/800605 
82 
 
Brennan, Pauline K. and Cassia Spohn. 2008. “Race/Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes Among 
Drug Offenders in North Carolina.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 24 (4): 
371-398. DOI: 10.1177/1043986208322712 
Burch, Traci. 2005. “Skin Color and the Criminal Justice System: Beyond Black-White 
Disparities in Sentencing.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 12 (3): 395-420. DOI: 
10.1111/jels.12077 
Bureau of Justice Assistance. 1996. “National Assessment of Structured Sentencing.” U.S. 
Department of Justice. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf.  
Champion, Dean J. 1989. “Private counsels and public defenders: A look at weak cases, prior 
records, and leniency in plea bargaining.” Journal of Criminal Justice, 17 (4): 253-263. 
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2352(89)90031-7 
D’Allesio, Stewart J and Lisa Stolzenberg. 1993. “Socioeconomic Status and the Sentencing of 
the Traditional offender.” Journal of Criminal Justice, 21 (1): 61-77. DOI: 10.1016/0047-
2352(93)90006-9 
Doerner, Jill K. and Stephen Demuth. 2009. “The Independent and Joint Effects of 
Race/Ethnicity, Sex, and Age on Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts.” Justice 
Quarterly, 27 (1): 1-27. DOI: 10.1080/07418820902926197 
Doerner, Jill K. and Stephen Demuth. 2012. “Sex and Sentencing in the Federal Courts: Are 
Women Sentenced More Leniently?” Criminal Justice Policy Review, 25 (2): 242-269. 
DOI: 10.1177/0887403412466877 
Drennan, James. 2014. “Judicial Districts in North Carolina: North Carolina Courts 
Commission.” Presented at UNC School of Government, Chapel Hill. 
https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/BCCI-98/Meetings/2014-09-
83 
 
23/Drennan%20Powerpoint%20Presentation%20on%20Judicial%20Districts%201960-
2015.pdf 
Duncan, Randall W., John C. Speir, and Tammy S. Meredith. n.d. “The Effects of Adopting 
North Carolina’s Sentencing Guidelines in Georgia.” Georgia Public Policy Foundation, 
1-11. https://www.webcitation.org/66h6vcNhD 
Forman Jr., James. 2017. Locking up our Own. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
Freeman, Lorrin. 2011. “The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission: A 
History of its Creation and its Development of Structured Sentencing.” North Carolina 
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission. 
http://cdm16062.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16062coll9/id/375730 
Hamilton, Melissa. 2017. “Sentencing Disparities.” British Journal of American Legal Studies, 6 
(2): 177-224. DOI 10.1515/bjals-2017-0010 
Hashimoto, Erica J. 2007. “Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at 
the Pro Se Felony Defendant.” North Carolina Law Review, 85 (2): 423-488. 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/nclr85&i=435 
Helms, Ronald and David Jacobs. 2002. “The Political Context of Sentencing: An Analysis of 
Community and Individual Determinants.” Social Forces, 81 (2): 577-604. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3086483 
Helms, Ronald and S.E. Costanza. 2010. “Modeling the Politics of Punishment: A Contextual 
Analysis of Racial Disparity in Drug Sentencing.” Criminal Justice Review, 35 (4): 472-
491. DOI: 10.1177/0734016810373114 
Horton, Tracey L. 2005. “The effect of North Carolina's Structured Sentencing Act on racial 
disparity in felony sentencing.” Ph.D. diss Walden University. 
84 
 
Huang, W.S. Wilson, Mary A. Finn, R. Barry Ruback, and Robert R. Friedman. 1996. 
“Individual and Contextual Influences on Sentence Lengths: Examining Political 
Conservatism.” The Prison Journal, 76 (4): 398-419. DOI: 
10.1177/0032855596076004003 
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts. 2008 “The North Carolina Judicial System.” 
Judicial Department of the State of North Carolina. 
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/inline-
files/03_JudicialSystem.pdf?u7X9Wh3A7Hvglu3vhhLZGU18bDiUIxtg 
King, Nancy J., David A. Soulé, Sara Steen, and Robert R. Weidner. 2005. “When Process 
Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences after Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury 
Trial in Five Guidelines States.” Columbia Law Review, 105 (4): 959-1009. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4099426 
Koeppel, Maria. 2014. “Sex Sentencing of Rural Property Offenders in Iowa.” Criminal Justice 
Policy Review, 25 (2): 208–26. DOI: 10.1177/0887403412465308 
Kramer, John H. and Jeffery T. Ulmer. 2002. “Downward departures for serious violent 
offenders: Local court ‘corrections’ to Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines.” 
Criminology, 40 (4): 897-932. http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search-
proquest-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/220704706?accountid=14244. 
Kutateladze, Besiki L. et al. 2014. “Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic 
Disparity in Prosecution and Sentencing.” Criminology, 52 (3): 514-551. DOI: 
10.1111/1745-9125.12047 
Lu, Yunmei. 2018. “Rural and Urban Differences in Sex-Sentencing Patterns of Pennsylvania.” 
Rural Sociology, 83 (2): 402-430. DOI: 10.1111/ruso.12204  
85 
 
Lubitz, Robin L. 1993. “Recent History of Sentencing Reform in North Carolina.” Federal 
Sentencing Reporter, 6 (3): 129-133. DOI: 10.2307/20639659 
Markham, Jamie. 2016. “All the Possible Sentences.” North Carolina Criminal Law [blog], 
February 4. https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/all-the-possible-sentences/ 
Markham, Jamie. 2014. “Fair Sentencing in a Nutshell.” North Carolina Criminal Law [blog], 
July 24. https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/fair-sentencing-in-a-nutshell/ 
Markham, Jamie. 2011. “Spot Sentencing.” North Carolina Criminal Law [blog], August 29. 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/spot-sentencing/ 
Markham, Jamie. 2010. “Sentence Reduction Credit: The Basics.” North Carolina Criminal Law 
[blog], June 16. https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/sentence-reduction-credit-the-basics/ 
Markham, Jamie. 2010. “Improper Consideration at Sentencing of a Defendant’s Decision to Go 
to Trial.” North Carolina Criminal Law [blog], December 15. 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/improper-consideration-at-sentencing-of-a-defendants-
decision-to-go-to-trial/ 
Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior. 2012. “Juvenile Justice 
and the Adolescent Brain.” http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/juvenilejustice/. (Accessed 
February 4, 2019). 
Mustard, David B. 2001. “Racial, Ethnic, and Sex Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the 
U.S. Federal Courts.” The Journal of Law and Economics, 44 (1): 285-314. DOI: 
10.1086/320276 
Myers, Martha A. and Susette M. Talarico. 1986. “Urban Justice, Rural Injustice? Urbanization 
and its Effect on Sentencing.” Criminology, 24 (2): 367-391. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-
9125.1986.tb01501.x 
86 
 
Nagel, Ilene H. and Barry L. Johnson. 1994. “The Role of Sex in a Structured Sentencing 
System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.” The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 85 (1): 181-221. DOI: 10.2307/1144116 
North Carolina Judicial Branch. 2018. “Punishment Grids.” North Carolina Judicial Branch 
https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/publications/punishment-grids. (Accessed February 
16, 2019). 
North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission. 2014. Structured Sentencing 
Training and Reference Manual. Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Sentencing and Policy 
Advisory Comission. 
Powell, LaToya. 2017. “’Raise the Age’ is Now the Law in North Carolina.” North Carolina 
Criminal Law [blog], August 31. https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/raise-age-now-law-
north-carolina/ 
Ryon, Stephanie B. et al. 2017. “Sentencing in light of collateral consequences: Does age 
matter?” Journal of Criminal Justice, 53 (1): 1-11. DOI: 10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2017.07.009 
Smith, Jessica. 2005. “Pleas and Plea Negotiations in North Carolina Superior Court.” UNC 
School of Government. 
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/200506PleasandP
leaNegotiations.pdf 
Spohn, Cassia and David Holleran. 2000. “The Imprisonment Penalty Paid by Young, 
Unemployed Black and Hispanic Male Offenders.” Criminology, 38 (1): 281-306. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1745-9125.2000.tb00891.x. 
87 
 
Steen, Sara et al. 2005. “Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case 
Processing, and Criminal Sentencing.” Criminology, 43 (2): 435-468. DOI: 
10.1111/j.0011-1348.2005.00013.x 
Steffensmeier, Darrell, Noah Painter-Davis, and Jeffery Ulmer. 2017. “Intersectionality of Race, 
Sex, and Age on Criminal Punishment.” Race, Ethnicity, and Social Policy, 60 (4): 810-
833. DOI: 10.1177/0731121416679371 
Steffensmeier, Darrell, Jeffery Ulmer and John Kramer. 1998. “The Interaction of Race, Sex, and 
Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black and Male.” 
Criminology, 36 (4): 763-797. http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search-
proquest-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/60080043?accountid=14244 
Tillyer, Rob, Richard D. Hartley, and Jeffrey T. Ward. 2015. “Differential Treatment of Female 
Defendants: Does Criminal History Moderate the Effect of Sex on Sentence Length in 
Federal Narcotics Cases?” Criminal Justice and Behavior, 42 (7): 703-721. DOI: 
10.1177/0093854814560624 
Ulmer, Jeffrey T. and Mindy S. Bradley. 2006. “Variation in trial penalties among serious 
violent offenses.” Criminology, 44 (3): 631-670. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-
9125.2006.00059.x 
Ulmer, Jeffrey T. and Brian D. Johnson. 2004. “Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis.” 
Criminology, 42 (1): 137-178, DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.2004.tb00516.x. 
Ulmer, Jeffrey T., James Eisenstein, and Brian D. Johnson. 2009. “Trial Penalties in Federal 
Sentencing: Extra‐Guidelines Factors and District Variation.” Justice Quarterly, 27 (4): 
560-592. DOI: 10.1080/07418820902998063 
Ward, Bryan H. 2003. “A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal 
88 
 
Defendants Should Avoid the Alford Plea.” 
Missouri Law Review, 68, 1913-1943. 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/molr68&i=926 
 
 
  
89 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 2. Variable operationalization 
Dependent 
Variable 
Operationalization Data Source Code 
Harshness Harshness = Real 
Punishment / Risk 
Punishment 
Real Punishment vs. NC 
Structured Sentencing 
maximum sentences  
LB_Harsh 
 
Harsh = 
LB_Harsh*100 
Independent 
Variable 
Operationalization Data Source  
Race Defendant’s Race: 
White = 0 
Black = 1 
NC Court Database 
CRRACE 
LB_RaceBW 
Sex Defendant’s Sex: 
Female = 0 
Male = 1 
NC Court Database 
CRRSEX 
LB_Sex 
Race/Sex 
Interaction 
Defendant’s Race and 
Sex: 
White Female = 0 
Black Female = 1 
White Male = 2 
Black Male = 3 
NC Court Database 
CRRACE 
CRRSEX 
LB_RG4 
Age Defendant’s Age when 
Charged: 
Age Groupings – 
15-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-
50, 50+ 
 
 
NC Court Database 
CROCDT-CRRDOB 
LB_AgeatCrime 
(Precise Age) 
 
AgeGroup 
(Age Groupings) 
Type of 
Attorney 
Defendant’s Attorney in 
District Court: 
Privately Retained 
Attorney = 0 
Public Defender = 1 
Court Appointed 
Attorney = 2 
Waived/Self-
Representation = 3 
NC Court Database 
CRRDAT 
LB_Atty 
Judicial 
District 
Number of the Judicial 
District in 2014: 
Districts in which there 
are multiple sections (i.e. 
9A and 9B) are 
combined because some 
NC Court Database 
CRRKCY (county code) 
and 
Map from UNC School 
of Government 
LB_Dist 
 
(Map 1) 
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counties contain more 
than one section 
Presentation (Drennan, 
2014) 
Population Population of County of 
Case in 2010: 
Total number of people 
per county 
NC Court Database 
CRRKCY 
and 
US Census Bureau 
Population Data 2010 
pop2010 
Political 
Context 
Trump Share of Vote per 
Judicial District: 
Cumulative percent of  
NC Court Database 
CRRKCY 
and 
Election data from Dr. 
Baumgartner 
TrumpDistrictShare 
District 
Racial 
Composition 
District Race – 
Percentage of judicial 
district which is 
nonwhite 
NC Court Database 
CRRKCY 
And 
US Census Bureau 
Population Data 2010 
PctWhiteDistrict 
Prior 
Criminal 
Record 
Points 
Defendant’s Prior Record 
Points Grouped by 
Punishment Grid – 
0 – 1 point = 0 
2 – 5 points = 1 
6 – 9 points = 2 
10 – 13 points = 3 
14 – 17 points = 4 
18+ points = 5 
NC Court Database 
CRDPRPT 
LB_PriorPts 
Offense 
Severity 
Offense Class: 
Charged –  
Number of charges per 
offense class for each 
defendant 
Convicted –  
Number of convictions 
per offense class for each 
defendant 
NC Court Database (as 
coded by Dr. 
Baumgartner’s graduate 
student) 
Various variables coded 
for the number of 
charges/convictions of 
each class of crime 
 
Plea Type Type of Plea Defendant 
Takes: 
Guilty to Lesser = 0 
Guilty = 1 
Not Guilty = 2 
Alford Plea = 3 
CRDPLE LB_plea 
Plea Type 2 Type of Plea Defendant 
Takes: 
Guilty to Lesser, Guilty, 
Alford plea = 0 
Not Guilty = 1 
CRDPLE LB_plea2 
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Model 3. Regression run with prior point categories listed; N = 6,040 
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Model 4. Regression run combining guilty pleas and comparing with not guilty pleas; N = 6,040 
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Model 5. Regression separating race and sex variables; N = 6,040 
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Model 6. Regression run if everyone had zero prior criminal record points; N=6,040 
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Model 7. Regression showing the impacts of other location factors; N = 6,040 
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Model 8. Regression without Attorney Type; N = 9,836 
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Figure 8. Annotated Do-File run in STATA 
*One, read the database, drop cases before Oct 1, 2013, those not yet 
resolved, not a-d felonies... 
cd G:\FB\DP\NC-current\AdminOfficeCourtsData2015\NC-AOC-data\Update-Feb2018\ 
clear 
use CR-23Feb2019.dta 
*drop cases before Oct 1 2013 
sum crrdts 
drop if crrdts < 20130931 
*drop unresolved cases 
sum crrddt 
drop if crrddt == . 
*drop those w/o any a-d felony arrest codes 
drop if charged_a == 0 & charged_b1 == 0 & charged_b2 == 0 & charged_c == 0 & 
charged_d == 0  
*Drop cases where the verdicts are measured in days, not months 
keep if verdict_unit == 2 
destring crdcst, replace 
*check codes for missing data on derived variables 
sum charged_a - verdict_unit 
recode charged_a - verdict_unit (-2=.) 
recode charged_a - verdict_unit (-1=.) 
 
cd G:\FB\teach\theses\LukeBeyer\ 
save Luke-a.dta, replace 
 
 
*collapse by disposition - person 
 
clear 
use Luke-a.dta 
collapse (last)  crradd crrcty crrdst crrzip crrdob crrace crrsex crrbondt 
crrdat crdple (max) crocdt crdprpt crdcst crrbonda (sum) charged_a - 
verdict_max_b, by(crrddt crrkcy crrnam) 
save Luke-b.dta, replace 
tab1 charged_a charged_b* charged_c charged_d  arraigned_a arraigned_b* 
arraigned_c arraigned_d verdict_a verdict_b* verdict_c verdict_d, miss 
 
 
cd G:\FB\teach\theses\LukeBeyer\ 
clear 
use Luke-b.dta 
 
 
*drop those w/o any a-d felony arrest codes 
drop if charged_a == 0 & charged_b1 == 0 & charged_b2 == 0 & charged_c == 0 & 
charged_d == 0  
 
*Creating Race Variable 
gen LB_Race = 0 if crrace=="W" 
replace LB_Race = 1 if crrace=="B" 
replace LB_Race = 1 if crrace=="H" 
replace LB_Race = 1 if crrace=="O" 
 
gen LB_RaceBW = 0 if crrace=="W" 
replace LB_RaceBW = 1 if crrace=="B" 
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*Creating Sex Variable 
gen LB_Sex = 0 if crrsex=="F" 
replace LB_Sex = 1 if crrsex=="M" 
 
*Race x gender 
gen LB_RG4 = 0 if crrsex=="F" & LB_RaceBW==0 
recode LB_RG4 (. = 1) if crrsex=="F" & LB_RaceBW==1 
recode LB_RG4 (. = 2) if crrsex=="M" & LB_RaceBW==0 
recode LB_RG4 (. = 3) if crrsex=="M" & LB_RaceBW==1 
 
*Creating Age Variable 
*drop LB_DOB LB_OffDate LB_AgeatCrime 
destring crrdob, gen(temp_DOB) 
gen temp_YOB = floor(temp_DOB/10000) 
gen temp_monthb = temp_DOB - (temp_YOB*10000) 
gen temp_MOB = floor(temp_monthb/100) 
gen temp_DayOB = temp_monthb - (temp_MOB*100) 
gen LB_BirthDate = mdy(temp_MOB , temp_DayOB , temp_YOB) 
gen LB_BirthDate2 = LB_BirthDate 
format LB_BirthDate2 %td 
drop temp_DOB temp_YOB temp_monthb temp_MOB temp_DayOB temp_YOB LB_BirthDate 
 
*CROCDT 
gen double temp_DOC = crocdt 
gen temp_YOC = floor(temp_DOC/10000) 
gen temp_monthc = temp_DOC - (temp_YOC*10000) 
gen temp_MOC = floor(temp_monthc/100) 
gen temp_DayOC = temp_monthc - (temp_MOC*100) 
gen LB_ChargeDate = mdy(temp_MOC , temp_DayOC , temp_YOC) 
gen LB_ChargeDate2 = LB_ChargeDate 
format LB_ChargeDate2 %td 
drop temp_DOC temp_YOC temp_monthc temp_MOC temp_DayOC temp_YOC LB_ChargeDate 
 
gen LB_AgeatCrime = (LB_ChargeDate2 - LB_BirthDate2)/365.25 
 
***To make age categories 
*spikeplot on age, or "sum, d" 
sum LB_AgeatCrime, d 
spikeplot LB_AgeatCrime, round(1) 
 
egen AgeGroup = cut(LB_AgeatCrime), at(15,20,30,40,50,150) 
*Play with that by saying 
sort AgeGroup 
by AgeGroup: sum LB_AgeatCrime 
 
*This will tell you how it handled cases in the extremens and  
*exactly where it drew the lines: 20, or 19.999) 
 
*Creating Socioeconomic Status Variable 
 
*Creating Attorney Variable 
gen LB_Atty = 0 if crrdat=="R" 
replace LB_Atty = 1 if crrdat=="P" 
replace LB_Atty = 2 if crrdat=="A" 
replace LB_Atty = 3 if crrdat=="W" 
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*Creating Population Variable 
gen LB_fips = (1) if crrkcy == 000 
replace LB_fips = (3) if crrkcy == 010 
replace LB_fips = (5) if crrkcy == 020 
replace LB_fips = (7) if crrkcy == 030 
replace LB_fips = (9) if crrkcy == 040 
replace LB_fips = (11) if crrkcy == 050 
replace LB_fips = (13) if crrkcy == 060 
replace LB_fips = (15) if crrkcy == 070 
replace LB_fips = (17) if crrkcy == 080 
replace LB_fips = (19) if crrkcy == 090 
replace LB_fips = (21) if crrkcy == 100 
replace LB_fips = (23) if crrkcy == 110 
replace LB_fips = (25) if crrkcy == 120 
replace LB_fips = (27) if crrkcy == 130 
replace LB_fips = (29) if crrkcy == 140 
replace LB_fips = (31) if crrkcy == 150 
replace LB_fips = (33) if crrkcy == 160 
replace LB_fips = (35) if crrkcy == 170 
replace LB_fips = (37) if crrkcy == 180 
replace LB_fips = (39) if crrkcy == 190 
replace LB_fips = (41) if crrkcy == 200 
replace LB_fips = (43) if crrkcy == 210 
replace LB_fips = (45) if crrkcy == 220 
replace LB_fips = (47) if crrkcy == 230 
replace LB_fips = (49) if crrkcy == 240 
replace LB_fips = (51) if crrkcy == 250 
replace LB_fips = (53) if crrkcy == 260 
replace LB_fips = (55) if crrkcy == 270 
replace LB_fips = (57) if crrkcy == 280 
replace LB_fips = (59) if crrkcy == 290 
replace LB_fips = (61) if crrkcy == 300 
replace LB_fips = (63) if crrkcy == 310 
replace LB_fips = (65) if crrkcy == 320 
replace LB_fips = (67) if crrkcy == 330 
replace LB_fips = (69) if crrkcy == 340 
replace LB_fips = (71) if crrkcy == 350 
replace LB_fips = (73) if crrkcy == 360 
replace LB_fips = (75) if crrkcy == 370 
replace LB_fips = (77) if crrkcy == 380 
replace LB_fips = (79) if crrkcy == 390 
replace LB_fips = (81) if crrkcy == 400 
replace LB_fips = (83) if crrkcy == 410 
replace LB_fips = (85) if crrkcy == 420 
replace LB_fips = (87) if crrkcy == 430 
replace LB_fips = (89) if crrkcy == 440 
replace LB_fips = (91) if crrkcy == 450 
replace LB_fips = (93) if crrkcy == 460 
replace LB_fips = (95) if crrkcy == 470 
replace LB_fips = (97) if crrkcy == 480 
replace LB_fips = (99) if crrkcy == 490 
replace LB_fips = (101) if crrkcy == 500 
replace LB_fips = (103) if crrkcy == 510 
replace LB_fips = (105) if crrkcy == 520 
replace LB_fips = (107) if crrkcy == 530 
replace LB_fips = (109) if crrkcy == 540 
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replace LB_fips = (111) if crrkcy == 550 
replace LB_fips = (113) if crrkcy == 560 
replace LB_fips = (115) if crrkcy == 570 
replace LB_fips = (117) if crrkcy == 580 
replace LB_fips = (119) if crrkcy == 590 
replace LB_fips = (121) if crrkcy == 600 
replace LB_fips = (123) if crrkcy == 610 
replace LB_fips = (125) if crrkcy == 620 
replace LB_fips = (127) if crrkcy == 630 
replace LB_fips = (129) if crrkcy == 640 
replace LB_fips = (131) if crrkcy == 650 
replace LB_fips = (133) if crrkcy == 660 
replace LB_fips = (135) if crrkcy == 670 
replace LB_fips = (137) if crrkcy == 680 
replace LB_fips = (139) if crrkcy == 690 
replace LB_fips = (141) if crrkcy == 700 
replace LB_fips = (143) if crrkcy == 710 
replace LB_fips = (145) if crrkcy == 720 
replace LB_fips = (147) if crrkcy == 730 
replace LB_fips = (149) if crrkcy == 740 
replace LB_fips = (151) if crrkcy == 750 
replace LB_fips = (153) if crrkcy == 760 
replace LB_fips = (155) if crrkcy == 770 
replace LB_fips = (157) if crrkcy == 780 
replace LB_fips = (159) if crrkcy == 790 
replace LB_fips = (161) if crrkcy == 800 
replace LB_fips = (163) if crrkcy == 810 
replace LB_fips = (165) if crrkcy == 820 
replace LB_fips = (167) if crrkcy == 830 
replace LB_fips = (169) if crrkcy == 840 
replace LB_fips = (171) if crrkcy == 850 
replace LB_fips = (173) if crrkcy == 860 
replace LB_fips = (175) if crrkcy == 870 
replace LB_fips = (177) if crrkcy == 880 
replace LB_fips = (179) if crrkcy == 890 
replace LB_fips = (181) if crrkcy == 900 
replace LB_fips = (183) if crrkcy == 910 
replace LB_fips = (185) if crrkcy == 920 
replace LB_fips = (187) if crrkcy == 930 
replace LB_fips = (189) if crrkcy == 940 
replace LB_fips = (191) if crrkcy == 950 
replace LB_fips = (193) if crrkcy == 960 
replace LB_fips = (195) if crrkcy == 970 
replace LB_fips = (197) if crrkcy == 980 
replace LB_fips = (199) if crrkcy == 990 
 
*Import USDA Population database and line up with Fips code 
*rename  
gen fips = LB_fips+37000 
joinby fips using Luke-additional-county.dta, unm(master) 
rename _merge _merge2 
joinby LB_District using Luke-additional-District.dta, unm(master) 
 
*Prior Points 
destring crdprpt, gen(Points) 
gen LB_PriorPts = 0 if crdprpt == 00 | crdprpt == 01 
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replace LB_PriorPts = 1 if crdprpt == 02 | crdprpt == 03 | crdprpt == 04 | 
crdprpt == 05 
replace LB_PriorPts = 2 if crdprpt == 06 | crdprpt == 07 | crdprpt == 08 | 
crdprpt == 09 
replace LB_PriorPts = 3 if crdprpt == 10 | crdprpt == 11 | crdprpt == 12 | 
crdprpt == 13 
replace LB_PriorPts = 4 if crdprpt == 14 | crdprpt == 15 | crdprpt == 16 | 
crdprpt == 17 
replace LB_PriorPts = 5 if crdprpt > 17  
 
save Luke-c.dta, replace 
 
*Calculate Harshness Variable - use worse possible number. Assume 0 points 
first. then gen punishment 
*change variable names here from ClassATotal to charged_a etc. through 
charged_i 
 
gen LB_Risk0 = 1200*charged_a + 300*charged_b1 + 196*charged_b2 + 
92*charged_c + 80*charged_d + 31*charged_e + 20*charged_f + 16*charged_g + 
8*charged_h + 8*charged_i if LB_PriorPts == 0 
gen LB_Risk1 = 1200*charged_a + 345*charged_b1 + 225*charged_b2 + 
104*charged_c + 92*charged_d + 36*charged_e + 23*charged_f + 18*charged_g + 
10*charged_h + 8*charged_i if LB_PriorPts == 1 
gen LB_Risk2 = 1200*charged_a + 397*charged_b1 + 258*charged_b2 + 
120*charged_c + 105*charged_d + 41*charged_e + 27*charged_f + 21*charged_g + 
12*charged_h + 8*charged_i if LB_PriorPts == 2 
gen LB_Risk3 = 1200*charged_a + 456*charged_b1 + 297*charged_b2 + 
138*charged_c + 121*charged_d + 48*charged_e + 31*charged_f + 24*charged_g + 
14*charged_h + 10*charged_i if LB_PriorPts == 3 
gen LB_Risk4 = 1200*charged_a + 600*charged_b1 + 342*charged_b2 + 
159*charged_c + 139*charged_d + 55*charged_e + 36*charged_f + 27*charged_g + 
19*charged_h + 11*charged_i if LB_PriorPts == 4 
gen LB_Risk5 = 1200*charged_a + 600*charged_b1 + 393*charged_b2 + 
182*charged_c + 160*charged_d + 63*charged_e + 41*charged_f + 31*charged_g + 
25*charged_h + 12*charged_i if LB_PriorPts == 5 
recode LB_Risk* (.=0) 
gen LB_Risk = LB_Risk0+LB_Risk1+LB_Risk2+LB_Risk3+LB_Risk4+LB_Risk5 
 
gen LB_Harsh = verdict_min_b / LB_Risk 
 
gen Harsh = LB_Harsh*100 
 
*Plea type variable 
gen LB_plea = 0 if crdple=="GL" 
replace LB_plea = 1 if crdple=="GU" 
replace LB_plea = 2 if crdple=="NG" 
replace LB_plea = 3 if crdple=="GA" 
 
*Spikeplot of Harshness outcomes 
spikeplot Harsh if LB_Atty < 4 & LB_RaceBW < 2 & LB_plea < 4 & LB_PriorPts < 
10000 & Harsh < 100000 & AgeGroup < 100 & LB_Dist < 31, round(5) 
 
*Spikeplot at prior criminal record level 
spikeplot LB_PriorPts if LB_Atty < 4 & LB_RaceBW < 2 & LB_plea < 4 & 
LB_PriorPts < 10000 & Harsh < 100000 & AgeGroup < 100 & LB_Dist < 31 
 
*Frequency distribution table of plea types 
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tab LB_Plea if LB_Atty < 4 & LB_RaceBW < 2 & LB_plea < 4 & LB_PriorPts < 
10000 & Harsh < 100000 & AgeGroup < 100 & LB_Dist < 31 
 
*Spikeplot age 
spikeplot LB_AgeatCrime if LB_Atty < 4 & LB_RaceBW < 2 & LB_plea < 4 & 
LB_PriorPts < 10000 & Harsh < 100000 & AgeGroup < 100 & LB_Dist < 31, 
round(1) 
 
*Regression (main) - Model 1 
reg Harsh LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Atty i.LB_Dist 
 
*Regression for 3 levels of risk (low, med, high) - Model 2 
drop LB_RiskL 
egen LB_RiskL = cut(LB_Risk), at(0,80,120,185,19000) 
sum LB_RiskL LB_Risk 
 
sort LB_RiskL 
by LB_RiskL: reg Harsh LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Atty 
i.LB_Dist 
 
*Frequency distribution of age groups with prior points levels 
tab LB_PriotPts AgeGroup if LB_Atty < 4 & LB_RaceBW < 2 & LB_plea < 4 & 
LB_PriorPts < 10000 & Harsh < 100000 & AgeGroup < 100 & LB_Dist < 31 
 
*Regression to Show that the prior points effect is consistent - Model 3 
reg Harsh i.LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.LB_Atty i.AgeGroup i.LB_Dist 
 
*Regression combining plea types - Model 4 
gen LB_plea2 = 0 if LB_plea==0 
replace LB_plea2 = 0 if LB_plea==1 
replace LB_plea2 = 0 if LB_plea==3 
replace LB_plea2 = 1 if LB_plea==2 
reg Harsh LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea2 i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Atty i.LB_Dist 
 
*Regression to show Race and Sex separated - Model 5 
reg Harsh LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea i.LB_RaceBW LB_Sex i.LB_Atty i.AgeGroup 
i.LB_Dist 
 
*Regression if the Defendant had 0 Prior Record Points - Model 6 
gen LB_RiskNo = 1200*charged_a + 300*charged_b1 + 196*charged_b2 + 
92*charged_c + 80*charged_d + 31*charged_e + 20*charged_f + 16*charged_g + 
8*charged_h + 8*charged_i 
gen LB_HarshNo = verdict_min_b / LB_RiskNo 
gen HarshNo = LB_HarshNo*100 
reg HarshNo crdprpt i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Atty i.LB_Dist 
 
*Regression with location factos - Model 7 
reg Harsh LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Atty pop2010 
TrumpDistrictShare PctWhiteDistrict 
 
*Regression without attorney type - Model 8 
reg Harsh LB_PriorPts i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Dist 
 
*Running the Regression without Prior Record Points to Look at Effect with 
Age - Unused Model 
reg Harsh i.LB_plea i.LB_RG4 i.AgeGroup i.LB_Atty i.LB_Dist 
